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THE PARADOX OF LEGAL EQUIVALENTS
AND SCIENTIFIC EQUIVALENCE:
RECONCILING PATENT LAW'S DOCTRINE




Contrary to popular perception, generic drugs often enter the market
before the patents covering their brand name counterparts have expired by
making slight changes to the drug to avoid the brand name patent. These
generics face a paradox: the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
requires that the generic "not show a significant difference" from the refer-
ence product, while patent law requires that the generic have "substantial
differences" as compared to the reference product. The generic must be
bioequivalent, but not legally equivalent, to the brand name drug. This par-
adox occurs frequently in the courts but has never been discussed in the
literature. This Article analyzes every case to date involving this equiva-
lence paradox to create a normative theory explaining and predicting
courts' treatment of these cases. It then explains the implications for patent
law. Namely, it demonstrates how courts use these cases as an opportunity
to tailor the scope of the patent based on its ability to provide ex post incen-
tives for commercialization and development. Finally, this Article discusses
the broader implications of the paradox on FDA law and concludes that
these cases demonstrate that, while courts are increasingly skeptical of ever-
greening, the paradox impedes progress towards cheaper, safer medicine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CC ULY then, I fear you are damned both by father and
mother. Thus when I shun Scylla, your father, I fall into Cha-
rybdis, your mother. Well, you are gone both ways."'
Generic drug manufacturers face a paradox. First, they must create a
product that is bioequivalent to a brand name drug to obtain approval
from the FDA. 2 Second, they must create a product that does not in-
fringe, either literally or by equivalents, on the brand name drug's pat-
ent.3 A generic drug is bioequivalent if it does "not show a significant
difference" from the reference product.4 However, a generic drug in-
fringes by equivalents if it is not "substantially different" from the refer-
ence drug's patent.5 Thus, the law requires generic drug manufacturers to
be bioequivalent but not legally equivalent.6 This paradox appears fre-
quently in litigation but has never been addressed by the literature.7
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 5.
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
3. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) ("[A]
product or process that does not literally infringe . .. the express terms of a patent claim
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the
accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.").
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i).
5. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
6. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the paradox existing between the bioe-
quivalence requirement and the doctrine of equivalents).
7. See infra Part III (detailing presence of this paradox in numerous cases).
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This Article conducts a comprehensive analysis of every case that deals
with bioequivalent drugs that are alleged to be legally equivalent. I docu-
ment both manufacturing and patenting strategies that are more or less
successful at navigating the equivalence paradox and the implications for
patent law, evergreening, and drug availability and safety. In doing so, I
seek to answer two questions: first, what principle explains and predicts
the outcome of these cases, and second, whether there is a theoretical
grounding for the courts' decisions in either patent law or FDA law. The
answers to these questions are important to scholars studying legal theory
and policy makers seeking to craft a coherent set of laws regulating the
pharmaceutical industry.
Our society has placed a bet on generic drugs as an answer to our rap-
idly increasing healthcare finance woes. Generic drugs do not have the
same market monopoly possessed by brand name innovator drugs8 and
can get FDA approval with fewer costly studies.9 Consequently, they are
significantly less expensive than brand name products.' 0 Generic drugs
are supposed to be completely interchangeable with their brand name
counterparts, and pharmacists are permitted to substitute a generic drug
when a doctor prescribes a brand name medication." To encourage com-
panies to create generic drugs, Congress provided the statutory incentive
of temporary market exclusivity.12
Generic drugs do not have to be identical to the brand name product.'3
Despite popular perception, they rarely are. This is because generic drug
manufacturers must account for brand name patents.14 Even once brand
name drugs are off-patent, they are usually off-patent only with respect to
the portion of their patent portfolio that covered the drug's active ingre-
dients.'5 The brand name drug is still protected by weaker patents cover-
8. See Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of Monopoly
Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving Delayed Entry of Generic
Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 81, 91 (2004) (discussing the monopoly power brand name drug
manufacturers enjoy over their generic counterparts).
9. Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs; Availability of List, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (Oct.
31, 1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 20) ("[The] FDA believes it is neither in the
interest of the public health nor a productive use of the nation's scarce research resources
to require costly duplication of tests. A regulatory system that requires such duplicative
testing is wasteful, anticompetitive, scientifically unsound, and ethically dubious.").
10. See Facts About Generic Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources-
ForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/
ucml67991.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) ("On average, the cost of a generic drug is 80 to
85 percent lower than the brand name product.").
11. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing state laws that provide for
generic drug substitution).
12. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the 180-day exclusivity provi-
sion of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
13. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (discussing the bioequivalence re-
quirement for generic drugs).
14. Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The would-be
manufacturer of a generic bioequivalent to a previously approved branded drug may file
an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the [FDA] while the branded drug is
purportedly protected by a patent.").
15. See FTC, GENERIc DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTS STUDY
39-40 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (noting that
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ing different dosage forms or formulations. 16 Generic companies must
create a product that does not infringe on those patents.' 7 This results in
generic drugs that differ in some respect from their brand name
counterparts.
While designing around a brand name patent, the generic companies
must stay within the FDA's guidelines. The FDA requires "bioe-
quivalence"-meaning that generic drugs must show that they have an
activity level that falls within 80% to 125% of the brand name drug's
activity level.18 This creates a challenge for generic companies who must
satisfy the bioequivalence requirement but must still avoid infringing on
the brand name drug's patents.
Further complicating the situation, the brand name drug is protected
not only by the literal language of the patent, but also by the judicially-
created "doctrine of equivalents." The doctrine of equivalents broadens
the scope of a patent beyond its literal meaning to encompass products
that perform "substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result."' 9 The intent is to prevent a competitor
from committing a "fraud on a patent" by changing an insignificant detail
such that their product is outside the literal scope of the language but
should, equitably, still fall within the patent's protection.20
Yet this is precisely what Congress encourages generic companies to
do: create a product that is almost identical to the brand name product so
that it can be sold at a lower price. 21 On one hand, generic companies
face bioequivalency regulations, which restrict how different the generic
may be from the brand name product,22 and, on the other, the doctrine of
equivalents, which restricts how similar the generic may be to the brand
name product. 2 3 Generic companies face the paradox of creating a prod-
uct that is bioequivalent but not legally equivalent. 24
In Part II of this Article, I provide a general overview of patent law,
including the doctrine of equivalents, and discuss the role of the Hatch-
Watchman Act in this analysis. In Part III, I conduct a comprehensive
study of every case to-date and patent involving the doctrine of
brand-name drug companies are often suing for three or more patent infringement claims
for each high-earning drug); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to
Make A Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316 (2010) (noting that "the average number of patents
per drug is 2.97; the median number is two. Sixty-seven percent of drugs have more than
one patent").
16. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
18. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the pharmacokinetic parame-
ters for generic drugs).
19. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
20. See id.
21. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the Hatch-Waxman Act and its underly-
ing goal of lowering prices of drugs through the creation of an ANDA pathway).
22. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a)(1) (2012).
23. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
24. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the paradox existing between the bioe-
quivalence requirement and the doctrine of equivalents).
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equivalents and generic products to explore the response of generic com-
panies and the courts to this paradox. I conclude that the cases are rarely
aimed at the core patent protecting the drug but instead focus on down-
stream commercialization and development efforts. The results suggest
that courts are skeptical of these downstream patents, perhaps because
they are often a consequence of evergreening.
In Part IV, I seek a theory to explain and predict the outcomes of
equivalence paradox cases. I conclude that courts (perhaps uncon-
sciously) base their decision on whether the generic work-around adds
commercial value to the product, an approach consistent with the Federal
Circuit's use of commercial success as a secondary consideration in deter-
mining obviousness. In Part V, I reconcile the treatment of these cases
with patent theory. I find that courts are primarily concerned with creat-
ing optimal ex post incentives and use the cases to help address the chal-
lenge of determining the proper patent scope toward this goal.
Under the prospect theory, patents are intended to encourage down-
stream innovation by giving the patentee a monopoly to coordinate inno-
vative efforts;25 however, there comes a point where the patent's ex post
incentives are no longer sufficient to incentivize innovation. As a theoret-
ical matter, the patent should end at that point. As a practical matter, it is
essentially impossible to correctly determine the precise patent scope and
length necessary to maximize the patentee's downstream innovative po-
tential without granting an excessive monopoly and incurring deadweight
loss. 2 6 Equivalence paradox cases give the legal system a second bite at
the patent-scope apple. Courts have a chance to view the competitive
landscape after the patent has been granted and adjust the scope of the
patent based on whether its prospective function is succeeding.
In Part VI, I address questions of FDA law. In particular, I suggest that
courts may use the commercial value of the generic product as a proxy to
test whether the brand name patent is adopted solely for evergreening or
if it actually adds social value. I also address the aim of the Hatch-Wax-
man Act: safer, cheaper medicine. I find that patent law hinders the goals
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and that equivalence cases highlight an area
where two separate legal doctrines overlap to create perverse incentives.
This emphasizes the need to create a more coherent body of law gov-
erning the pharmaceutical industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT BOUNDARIES AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The American patent system is designed to promote innovation.27 It
25. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing Edmund Kitch's prospect theory and
other ex post incentives of patent law).
26. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the issue of determining sufficient patent
scope to incentivize downstream innovation).
27. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) ("The patent monopoly was not
designed to secure to the inventor his natural right to his discoveries. Rather, it was a
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does so by offering inventors a tradeoff: they are awarded exclusive rights
in their inventions for a limited period of time while the public receives a
disclosure of the details of their inventions. 28 This disclosure allows other
inventors to create follow-on products based on the original technology
and, after the patent term expires, allows competitors to use the disclo-
sure to make their original inventions. 29 Patentees describe their inven-
tions using "claims," as required by statute.30 These claims define the
subject matter covered by the patent. 3'
A patent gives its holder the right to exclude others from making, us-
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts."'); see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Impli-
cations of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 526 (1998); Lawrence Lessig,
Intellectual Property and Code, 11 Sr. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638 (1996).
28. D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of
Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L. J. 751, 756 (2011).
29. Id. Note that the efficiency of our patent system and whether it actually incen-
tivizes innovation is a matter of great controversy. Compare Robert P. Merges & Richard
R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 843-44
(1990) (explaining that the goal of the patent system should be to maximize the innovative
incentives of multiple parties over time and that patent rights can reduce innovation by
blocking competitors from participating in the innovative process), with Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977) (arguing
that patents reward innovators and encourage innovation). For an overview of many theo-
ries of patent incentives, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1596-1615 (2003) (summarizing the major models).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (The patent specification must "conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the appli-
cant regards as his invention.").
31. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). It is widely acknowl-
edged that while claims are important in defining the scope of the patent, they do not
always do so effectively. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability
in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 209-17 (2001) (describing the problems that result from inconsis-
tent claim construction); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodolo-
gies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 58 (2005) (providing
an overview of claim construction practices); Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the
Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42
IDEA 1, 2 (2002) (explaining that inconsistent claim construction practices waste judicial
resources); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 231, 239 (2005) (showing that district courts' claim
construction findings are reversed by the Federal Circuit 34.5% of the time); Kelly Casey
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv.
333, 343 (2007) (describing scholar's criticism of the unpredictability of claim construction).
In addition to the problems of claim construction, patentees can often amend their claims
after the patent has been granted, which creates additional problems with relying on
claims' definitional function. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 523, 525 (2010) (exploring the ways in which patentees can change claims after a
patent has been granted, and arguing that these changing claims create problems in the
patent system); William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent
Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 327, 358-59 (2009); Paul M. Janicke, When Patents are Broadened Midstream: A
Compromise Solution to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CN. L. REv. 7,
25-29 (1997).
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ing, selling, offering for sale, or importing the invention.32 It does not,
however, give the holder an affirmative right to practice the invention.33
Literal infringement requires that the accused invention replicate every
detail of the patent.34 Courts have long recognized that restricting patent
infringement to literal infringement would "convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."35 It would be simple for an
"unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions in the patent" and replicate the product while leaving
the patentee without a legal remedy.36
To avoid the problem of the "unscrupulous copyist," courts developed
the equitable doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine, which first appeared
in case law in 1853,37 states that an accused product that does not infringe
literally may still infringe if it does "the same work in substantially the
same way, and accomplish[es] substantially the same result" as the pat-
ented product, "even though [it] differ[s] in name, form or shape."38 The
32. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, . . .
of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.").
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
34. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950).
35. Id. at 607. Other courts and scholars support this view. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) ("If patents were always
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished."); Tun-Jen Chi-
ang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1138
(2011) (arguing that if the patent's scope were "confined to precise replication . . . then
pirates would quickly learn to copy the principle or the heart of the patent without repli-
cating the precise embodiment . . . . Protection limited to literal reproduction is worthless
and easily circumvented."). But see Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1371, 1404 (2010) (arguing that the recent trend towards
de-emphasizing the doctrine of equivalents means that "courts have challenged the legiti-
macy of the premise that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to protect the incentive
structure of the patent system. And, the idea that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary
to encourage inventors to invent and to disclose inventions may have been found wanting.
Ample evidence suggests that all the while the courts were killing the doctrine of
equivalents, patent applicants were increasing the rate at which they filed applications for
new inventions."); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Para-
dox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2009) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents may
actually reduce the incentive to innovate because a rule preventing a patentee from claim-
ing downstream inventions as equivalents would "create[] an incentive for the patentee to
continue to innovate and improve upon her invention because others also [would] have an
opportunity to invent and patent improvements on it").
36. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. Note that the characterization of a copyist as "un-
scrupulous" conflicts with later Federal Circuit jurisprudence encouraging copyists. See,
e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("We have often noted
that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides for 'designing
around' patented inventions, thus creating new innovation."); Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead
Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of
the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting
progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when they are pat-
ented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace. It should not be
discouraged . . . .").
37. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853).
38. Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
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purpose of the doctrine is to prevent "fraud on a patent" by preventing
instances where a patentee does not get the full benefit of his patent be-
cause a copyist changed a minor detail of the invention.39
There are two tests courts use to determine if a product has infringed
by equivalents. The first test is the "tripartite" or "function-way-result"
test.40 Under this test, the court asks "whether the accused device . . .
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
achieve substantially the same result." 41 The second test is the "insub-
stantial differences" test. Under this test the court looks at the substanti-
ality of the differences between the two products.42 The Supreme Court
has expressed no preference between the tests, stating that "the particular
linguistic framework used [to determine equivalence] is less important
than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry." 43
The key to applying the doctrine of equivalents is that it must be used
on an element-by-element basis, rather than on the product as a whole. 44
This means that the court must compare one element of the accused
product to one element of the patented product, rather than looking at
the similarities between the two holistically. 45 The purpose of this re-
quirement is to preserve a meaning for each of the claim's elements and
to avoid unduly enlarging the scope of the patent.46
Equivalency is a matter of fact. It "is not an absolute to be considered
in a vacuum." 47 Graver Tank Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co., a seminal doctrine of equivalents case, put forward several factors
courts should consider in determining equivalence: "the purpose for
which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when com-
bined with other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to per-
form."4 8 Graver-Tank further instructed courts to consider "whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the inter-
39. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
40. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 1016.
42. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997).
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id.
45. Id. This element-by-element approach has both supporters and detractors in the
literature. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, supra note 35, at 527 n.17 (supporting the element-by-
element analysis because it constricts the doctrine of equivalents and allows claims to "re-
tain[] some boundary-defining role"); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1253, 1273 (2011) (arguing that the element-by-element approach makes it too easy
for competitors to design around a product by making small, non-innovative changes);
Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1737, 1773-74 (2011) (supporting the element-by-element approach in the context of literal
infringement because it helps define claim scope); Esther Steinhauer, Using the Doctrine of
Equivalents to Provide Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection for Im-
provement Patents, 12 PACE L. REV. 491, 492-98 (1992) (suggesting that the element-by-
element approach is only suitable for non-pioneering, i.e., improvement, patents, whereas
pioneering patents should be assessed as a whole).
46. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
47. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde AirProds. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
48. Id.
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changeability of an ingredient" at issue.49
The range of equivalents that may be claimed under the doctrine de-
pends on the nature of the plaintiff's invention. A pioneer invention is
"commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function never
before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and im-
portance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distin-
guished from a mere improvement or perfection of what ha[s] gone
before."50 It is entitled to a greater scope of protection.5' "Mere improve-
ment" inventions may also use the doctrine of equivalents; however,
courts will grant them a narrower scope of equivalents. 52
Because the doctrine of equivalents is so fact dependent, the Federal
Circuit has long been concerned that lower courts would overuse the doc-
trine.53 An overbroad doctrine of equivalents would swallow the purpose
of claim limitations in patent law.5 4 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has
imposed several restrictions on the doctrine, including prior art limita-
tion,5 5 dedication to the public domain,56 and prosecution history estop-
49. Id.
50. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898).
51. Cont'1 Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 414 (1908); see also John
R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH
L.J. 35, 37 (1995). The extent to which the pioneer doctrine is still good law is debatable.
The Federal Circuit appeared to have overruled it in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988), writing that a patent's "'pio-
neer' status does not change the way infringement is determined." Id. at 1370. However,
the pioneer doctrine continues to be used by both the Federal Circuit and lower courts. For
an extensive survey of the doctrine, see Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doc-
trine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 389-404 (2012).
52. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 ("The doctrine operates not only in favor of the
patentee of a pioneer . . . invention, but also for the patentee of a secondary invention
consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful results .. . .").
53. See K-2 Corp. v. Salman S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Martin J. Adel-
man & Gary L. Fancione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that
Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 699 (1988) ("[T]he doctrine of
equivalents, once thought to be a narrow doctrine designed to prevent 'fraud on the pat-
ent,' has become an issue of fact to be resolved in virtually every patent suit.").
54. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that arise
with inconsistent claim construction).
55. The prior art limitation prevents courts from using the doctrine of equivalents to
expand a patent's claims to such an extent that it would include prior art. K-2 Corp., 191
F.3d at 1366-67 ("[T]he doctrine of equivalents cannot allow a patent to encompass subject
matter existing in the prior art."); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & As-
socs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[Prior art] limits the range of permissible
equivalents of a claim."). For scholarly explanations of and commentary on the prior-art
limitation, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Para-
digm, 54 DUKE L. J. 1, 115-16 (2004) (discussing the prior-art limitation and its policy
rationale); John Mills, Three "Non-Obvious" Modifications to Simplify and Rein in the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 649, 661 (2005) (explaining the mechanics of the
prior-art limitation). The rationale behind the limitation is that a patent that overlapped
with the prior art would not have been approved by the PTO during examination; there-
fore, the patent should not be able to gain that coverage after the fact through the doctrine
of equivalents. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 677.
56. If a patent owner discloses an equivalent in the specification of the patent but did
not claim it, the patentee cannot claim it under the doctrine of equivalents. Miller v.
Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) ("[T]he claim of a specific device or combi-
nation, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the
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pel.5 7 Courts frequently use these limitations, particularly prosecution
history estoppel, as a way to prevent brand name companies from claim-
ing that their generic competitors infringe by equivalents.58
The doctrine of equivalents is controversial. 59 Scholars have begun pre-
dicting the demise of the doctrine, noting that, in recent years, surpris-
patent are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed."); Johnson &
Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen a patent
drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedicates that un-
claimed subject matter to the public."); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558,
1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[S]ubject matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent applica-
tion is dedicated to the public."). The test for whether a patentee has dedicated material to
the public domain is "purely objective." Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1053 n.1. Namely, the "paten-
tee's subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether unclaimed subject matter has
been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public." Id. The rationale is that the doctrine
of equivalents is designed to protect patent owners against unanticipated uses; therefore,
patentees should not be allowed to use the doctrine to broaden their claims to encompass
uses they did anticipate. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
242 F.3d 1337, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
57. Prosecution history estoppel arises when the patentee limits the scope of the pat-
ent during prosecution. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 733 (2002). The rationale for prosecution history estoppel is to prevent patentees from
behaving strategically by filing narrow claims that easily pass examination and later broad-
ening the claims through application of the doctrine of equivalents. Maxwell v. J. Baker,
Inc., 86 F.3d 1098,1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("A patentee may not narrowly claim his invention
and then, in the course of an infringement suit, argue . . . the doctrine of equivalents ....
Such a result would merely encourage a patent applicant to present a broad disclosure in
the specification of the application and file narrow claims."); Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome
Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("An applicant should not be able deliber-
ately to narrow the scope of examination to avoid during prosecution scrutiny by the PTO
of subject matter ... and then, obtain in court . .. a scope of protection which encompasses
that subject matter.").
58. See Duramed Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 644 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Reckitt Benckiser Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 430 F. App'x 871, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ranbaxy
Pharm., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Glaxo Grp. Ltd., v.
Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 262 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Andrx
Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research
Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 190 F.3d
1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Duramed Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 552,
555 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 644 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Gabapentin Patent Litig.,
393 F. Supp. 2d 278, 293 (D.N.J. 2005); Aventis Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 335 F.
Supp. 2d 558, 569 (D.N.J. 2004); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 214 F.
Supp. 2d 581, 592 (E.D. Va. 2002), vacated, 356 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bayer AG v.
Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 1999), affd, 212 F.3d
1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 334, 352 (E.D. Pa.
1998), affd, 190 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm.,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 399, 406 (N.D. W. Va. 1998), aff'd, 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
59. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 53, at 677; T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution
History Estoppel, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 465, 466-67 (2000); Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (1997); Michael J. Meurer & Craig A. Nard, Inven-
tion, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1948 (2005); Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of
Patent Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 124 (2000);
Petherbridge, supra note 35, at 1372; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future after Festo, 19 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1157, 1163 (2004);
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ingly few plaintiffs have won their doctrine of equivalents arguments.60 In
particular, a study by John Allison and Mark Lemley found that although
plaintiffs win over 50% of patent cases, they won just 24% of doctrine of
equivalents cases between 2003 and 2011.61 Allison and Lemley posit that
Markman's requirement concerning how courts construe claims caused
this decline.62 They argue that because courts dispose of claim construc-
tion issues as a matter of law, courts cannot dispose of the entire case
before trial unless they also resolve claims of infringement on summary
judgment; therefore, a judge who has found no literal infringement as a
matter of law is likely to find the same for infringement by equivalents
merely to dispose of the case.63
Although this may signal that courts' treatment of the doctrine of
equivalents has changed, the doctrine remains important for litigants. For
example, ten percent of patent cases raise the doctrine.64 Although Al-
lison and Lemley point to the low rate of plaintiff wins as evidence of the
doctrine's decline,65 the win rate remains high in the equivalence paradox
cases studied in this article-suggesting that the doctrine of equivalence
may hold more relevance in this context than in patent litigation gener-
ally.6 6 In addition, it is well established that different industries innovate
differently; thus, conclusions about patents in general or patents within a
specific industry do not always apply to another industry. 67 The pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology industries, as a whole, have a higher-than-av-
erage plaintiff win rate,68 which is consistent with my finding that
equivalence paradox cases also have a high plaintiff win rate.69
B. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND BIOEQUIVALENCE
The Hatch-Waxman Act (formally known as the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984) sets out the abbreviated
John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 154 (2005).
60. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STrAN. L. REV. 955, 966 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 958.
63. Id.
64. A search of Westlaw's ALLFEDS database for "doctrine of equivalents" from 01/
01/2011 to 01/01/2012 yielded 191 results compared to a search for "patent infringement"
across the same dates which yielded 1403 results.
65. Allison & Lemley, supra note 60, at 967.
66. Allison and Lemley found that patentees won 40% of doctrine of equivalents cases
prior to Markman, but only 24% of cases decided between 1999 and 2007. Id. at 978. My
research has found that, in cases involving abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
products and the doctrine of equivalents, over a third of the cases were resolved in favor of
the plaintiffs, a rate closer to the pre-Markman plaintiff win rate than to the post-Markman
rate.
67. Burk & Lemley, supra note 29, at 1588-89.
68. The percentage of plaintiff wins in all pharmaceutical doctrine of equivalents cases
is derived by adding the percentage of wins in pharmaceutical and biotechnology doctrine
of equivalents cases as listed in the appendix of Allison & Lemley's article, supra note 60.
69. Note that the percentage of plaintiff wins in paradox cases is even higher than the
percentage of plaintiff wins in pharmaceutical and biotechnology cases as a whole.
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new drug application (ANDA) pathway.70 It was enacted as a compro-
mise between the brand name and generic industries and seeks to make
generic drugs available more cheaply while ensuring that brand name
companies retain sufficient incentives to invest in the research and devel-
opment of new drugs.71
The Act gives brand name products increased patent life7 2 and generic
products an abbreviated application pathway.73 To qualify to use the
ANDA pathway, a drug must be the "same as" a listed drug (i.e., a drug
approved through an NDA). 74 The term "same as" is defined as "identi-
cal in active ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, route of administration,
and conditions of use."7 5 If a generic is not the "same as" the listed drug,
it cannot be approved through an ANDA unless the applicant submits a
suitability petition and the FDA accepts the petition.7 6
Generic companies do not need to provide full safety and efficacy data
or conduct clinical trials.77 They merely need to demonstrate that their
product is "bioequivalent,"78 meaning that the rate and extent of absorp-
tion of the drug does "not show a significant difference from the rate and
extent of absorption of the listed drug."79 The applicant must also show
that the drug contains the same active ingredient(s) as the reference drug
and has the same route of administration, dosage form, and strength.80
70. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1538, 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 156).
71. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The Act emerged
from Congress's efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce brand name
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug
products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market.").
72. Patent life is extended by a "time equal to the regulatory review period for the
approved product. " 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006). The extension cannot be longer than five
years. Id. § 156(g)(1)(8). If applicants do not act with "due diligence" to further their
drug's application during this period, that time can be subtracted from the patent life. Id.
§ 156(c)(1).
73. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
74. See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.92(a)(1) (2012).
75. Id.
76. 21 C.F.R. § 314.93(b).
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1).
78. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) ("An abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain
... information to show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the listed drug" unless the
FDA has approved the applicant's suitability petition, filed according to 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(C).).
79. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B).
80. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(5). If the generic drug has a different ac-
tive ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, or strength, the applicant must sub-
mit a suitability petition to the FDA, which the FDA will grant only if no additional
investigations are necessary to support safety and efficacy. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(c); 21
C.F.R. § 314.93. Petitions must follow the rules set out in 21 C.F.R. § 10.20, which in turn
requires the use of a citizen's petition format specified by 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(c). 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.93(c). If a generic manufacturer does need additional data to support safety and effi-
cacy, it is not eligible to use the ANDA pathway, and must use the application process
described in 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (known as the 505(b)(2) pathway). The 505(b)(2) pathway
allows approval of generic drugs for which the investigations relied on were not conducted
by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a right of reference or
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The FDA has interpreted bioequivalence as the "absence of a signifi-
cant difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient . . .
becomes available at the site of drug action."81 The FDA assesses bioe-
quivalence by looking at pharmacokinetic data, specifically the parame-
ters that measure the cumulative drug concentration in systemic
circulation over a period of time and the maximum concentration of the
drug in the body during administration.8 2 These pharmacokinetic param-
eters must fall entirely within 80% to 125% of the mean pharmacokinetic
parameters of the listed drug.83
The FDA's primary concern is to protect "the patient against approval
of products that are not bioequivalent." 84 The Orange Book states that
the use of the described statistical methods means "that there is no more
use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). For more information on the 505(b)(2) pathway, see Tam Q.
Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics Under Existing
Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77 (2007); K. R. Kelleher,
FDA Approval of Generic Biologics: Finding a Regulatory Pathway, 14 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 245, 250-51 (2007).
81. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2012). The FDA allows a variety of study protocols, including
studies performed in vivo, in vitro, or both. Id. § 320.24(a). Section 320.24(b) lists ap-
proaches that are acceptable in descending order of accuracy, sensitivity, and reproducibil-
ity. The choice of study type is made in consultation with the FDA and is based on the site
of action of the drug in question and the ability of the study design to compare bioavai-
lability at that site between the generic and reference drug. FDA, APPROVED DRUG PROD-
ucTs wITH THERAPEUTIc EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at viii (2012) [hereinafter
ORANGE BOOK], available at http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-
drugs-gen/documents/document/ucm07l436.pdf. The FDA is committed to placing bioe-
quivalence study design guidance documents on its website and has developed almost 900
product-specific bioequivalence guidance documents. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOEQUIVALENCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC
PRODUCTS 1 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompli-
anceRegulatorylnformation/Guidance/JCM072872.pdf.
82. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 81, at ix. These parameters are known as Area Under
the Curve (AUC) and Cmax. AUC is the total area under a graphed curve where the x-axis
represents time and the y-axis represents drug concentration. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUA-
TION & RESEARCH AND CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: EXPOSURE-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS-STUDY DESIGN, DATA ANALYSIS, &
REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 14 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm072109.pdf. The AUC repre-
sents the average drug concentration in systemic circulation over a period of time. Id. Cmax
refers to the maximum concentration of a drug in the body during administration and is the
highest point on a graph where the x-axis represents time and the y-axis represents drug
concentration. Id. C,. is significant because it indirectly measures the rate of absorption
and relates to the drug's potential to cause side effects. Barbara M. Davit et al., Comparing
Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Review of 12 Years of Bioequivalence Data from the
United States Food and Drug Administration, 43 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1583, 1585
(2009).
83. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 81, at ix. The guidelines for statistical analysis are set
forth in 21 C.F.R. § 320.23(a)(2). Applicants must analyze their bioequivalence data using
a "one-sided test procedure." Id. This requires two tests. Id. The first "determines whether
a generic product (test), when substituted for a brand name product (reference), is signifi-
cantly less bioavailable." Id. The second determines "whether a brand-name product when
substituted for a generic product is significantly less bioavailable." Id. The applicant must
then calculate bioequivalence using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure and must
have a 90% confidence interval for certain pharmacokinetic parameters. Id. The 90% con-
fidence interval must fall entirely within 80% to 125% of the mean pharmacokinetic pa-
rameters of the listed drug. Id.
84. Id. at x.
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than a 5% chance that a generic . . . is not truly equivalent to the refer-
ence."s 5 Studies seem to back up this claim.86
If a generic drug is "therapeutically equivalent" to the reference prod-
uct, pharmacists may substitute the generic drug for the brand name drug
without special authorization from the physician.87 Whether pharmacies
are allowed to substitute interchangeable drugs is a matter of state law.88
All fifty states currently have a law that either allows for generic substitu-
tion or mandates generic substitution.89
There is heated debate in the healthcare industry about the validity of
the practice of substitution.90 Certain drugs have absorption rates that
vary significantly from patient to patient ("high variability drugs"). 91 The
pharmacokinetic parameters of approved generic high variability drugs
differ from their brand name counterparts, sometimes by more than ten
percent. 92 Even "bioequivalent" drugs that are not classified as highly
variable can have poor interchangeability in practice. For example, epi-
lepsy patients who switch to a generic drug occasionally begin to have
more frequent seizures.93 Additionally, one study showed that Israeli pa-
85. Id.
86. A study of 224 generic products approved in the first two years after passage of the
Act found that the AUC of generic and brand name products differed by an average of
only 3.5%. Stuart L. Nightingale & James C. Morrison, Generic Drugs and the Prescribing
Physician, 258 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1987). A study of 273 generic drug applications ap-
proved in 1997 found that the mean difference between the generic and brand name prod-
uct was 3.47% for AUC and 4.29% for Cmax. FDA, Review of Generic Bioequivalence
Studies, 282 JAMA 1995, 1995 (1999). A recent study of the 2070 generic applications
between 1996 and 2007 found that the mean difference between the generic and brand
name drugs was 3.56% for AUC and 4.35% for Cmax. Davit et al., supra note 82, at 1583.
Note that these studies were all conducted by FDA employees and thus have an inherent
bias.
87. Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and
Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 511, 524 (2011). The Orange Book defines "thera-
peutic equivalents" to mean two products that "are pharmaceutical equivalents [that] can
be expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to pa-
tients . . . ." ORANGE BOOK, supra note 81, at vii.
88. See Grabowski et al., supra note 87, at 524.
89. David R. Holmes et al., American College of Cardiology Foundation and American
Heart Association 2011 Health Policy Statement on Therapeutic Interchange and Substitu-
tion, 58 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1287, 1305 (2011).
90. See, e.g., Peter Meredith, Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic
Drug Substitution, 25 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2875, 2875-76 (2003); James A. Reiffel,
Formulation Substitution and Other Pharmacokinetic Variability, 85 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY
46D, 46D (2000); Sandra Sabatini et al., Drug Substitution in Transplantation, 33 AM J.
KIDNEY DISEASE 389, 389 (1999).
91. These drugs have more trouble meeting bioequivalence requirements. Barbara M.
Davit, Highly Variable Drugs: Observations from Bioequivalence Data Submitted to the
FDA for New Generic Drug Applications, 10 AM. Ass'N PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENTISTS J.
148, 151 (2008). The FDA recommends that ANDA applicants for high variability drugs do
bioequivalence studies with a larger number of subjects to compensate for the inconsis-
tency in bioavailability from patient to patient. Leslie Beneet, Professor of Biopharm. Scis.,
Presentation to FDA Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical Science: Therapeutic Con-
siderations of Highly Variable Drugs (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/06/slides/2006-4241s2-index.htm.
92. Davit et al., supra note 82, at 1590.
93. M.J. Berg et al., Generic Substitution in Treatment of Epilepsy: Case Evidence of
Breakthrough Seizures, 71 NEUROLOGY 525, 525-30 (2008).
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tients who switched from brand name warfarin (an anticoagulant) to ge-
neric warfarin needed higher doses of the generic product to achieve the
same results. 94
1. Provisions for Patent Infringement
A suit for patent infringement cannot be filed unless the defendant has
committed an act of infringement. 95 Research and development leading
to an FDA application is not an act of infringement. 96 Filing an ANDA is,
however, an act of artificial infringement, so brand name companies are
allowed to file infringement suits against generic companies as soon as an
ANDA has been filed.97 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages
generic companies to file invalidity suits against brand name patents, to
bring down the cost of drugs.98 To accomplish these goals, the Act in-
cludes a number of provisions governing patent infringement in the con-
text of ANDAs.
For example, when a brand name company files a new drug application
(NDA), it submits patent information to the FDA for any patent that
claims the relevant drug.99 The FDA compiles these patents in the Ap-
proved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, infor-
mally called the Orange Book.' 00 When a generic company files an
ANDA, it must provide a certification with respect to each patent listed
for the brand name product in the Orange Book.'0 The ANDA must
94. Hillel Halkin et al., Increased Warfarin Doses and Decreased International Normal-
ized Ratio Response After Nationwide Generic Switching, 74 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 215, 215-20 (2003).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
96. Id. § 271(e)(1). The Hatch-Waxman Act inserted this provision into the Patent Act
to effectively overrule the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Phar-
maceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the experimental use de-
fense did not protect a generic company who used a patented product to prepare an FDA
application). The Federal Circuit recognized that Roche had been overturned in Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("We can only conclude that
Congress intended the enactment of section 271(e)(1) to set aside the Roche interpretation
of section 271(a)."). This provision of 271(e)(1) has been discussed at length in the schol-
arly literature. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Sci-
ence in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L. J. 177, 178-80 (1987) (describing the
application of the doctrine in the context of biotechnology); Ned. A. Israelsen, Making,
Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 458-61 (1989)
(providing an overview of 271(e) and the cases interpreting it); Jordan P. Karp, Experimen-
tal Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L. J. 2169,
2169-70 (1991) (describing the history of the experimental use exception and arguing that
it should not be broadened); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The FDA Exemption and Research
Tools: The Federal Circuit Gets it Wrong, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 310-11 (2010) (summarizing
policy arguments for and against 271(e)).
97. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
98. Elizabeth S. Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 603 (2004).
99. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). There is controversy over which patents must be
listed in this way. See Weisswasser & Danzis, supra note 98, at 596-99.
100. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 81.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
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certify either that no such patents are listed in the Orange Book,102 that
the patents have expired,103 that the manufacturer does not intend to
market the generic until the patent has expired,' 0 4 or that the patent is
invalid or not infringed.10 5
The last option is called a "Paragraph IV" certification. 0 6 The brand
name company has forty-five days to file a lawsuit asserting that the ge-
neric drug infringes,' 07 in which case the ANDA approval is automati-
cally stayed for the shorter of thirty months or until a final court decision
of non-infringement.108 As an incentive for the generic company to take
on the costly process of a lawsuit, the Act gives 180 days of market exclu-
sivity to the first generic company to sue (meaning that no other generic
product based on the same brand name drug can be approved during that
time).109 If the brand name company wins the suit, the ANDA cannot be
approved until the patent expires." 0
These incentives-both the availability of additional market exclusivity
and the possibility of additional patent exclusivity-encourage pharma-
ceutical companies to behave strategically. Much has been written about
"evergreening," the process by which pharmaceutical companies file a
102. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
103. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
104. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
105. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
106. Julie D. Polovina, Note, Mutant Biologies: The 2010 Health-Reform Legislation's
Potential Impact on Reducing Biologic Research and Development Costs, 100 GEO. L.J.
2291, 2302 (2012).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). If the brand name company does not file a suit within
forty-five days, the ANDA is effective immediately. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). Note that the thirty-month provision is also highly
controversial, because it is the target of strategic behavior on the part of brand name com-
panies to extend their market monopoly. A study by the FTC found that 72% of NDA
holders who received a Paragraph IV certification filed a suit against the generic company.
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 14 (2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. For more information, see
Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent
Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 (2008); Claire
Comfort, Will the Federal Circuit's Eli Lilly v. Teva Decision Lead to Efforts to Abuse the
Modification Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH 2, 2-4 (2009);
Yuk Fung Hui, FDA's Proposed Rules on Patent Listing Requirements for New Drug and
30-Month Stays on ANDA Approval (Proposed Oct. 24, 2002), 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 325,
326-31 (2003); Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-
Waxman, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 47, 75-78 (2003); Christopher R. Walker, Deadly Delay /
Postponed Pills, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 262 (2010).
109. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). This is one of the most controversial provisions of
the Act. For more information on the 180-day exclusivity provision, see Scott Hemphill &
Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948-50 (2011); Erika Lietzan et al., A New History and Discus-
sion of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 335, 335-37 (2009); Erika Lietzan &
David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
49,49-75 (2007); Christopher S. Ponder, The Dubious Value of Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity,
45 Hous. L. REV. 555, 557-58 (2008); John R. McNair, Note, If Hatch Wins, Make Wax-
man Pay: One-Way Fee Shifting as a Substitute Incentive to Resolve Abuse of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 119, 123-26 (2007); Brian Porter, Comment,
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan's Effort to Close the Gaping Black
Hole in the Hatch- Waxman Act, 22 J. CONTEmP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 177, 179-82 (2005).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2006).
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number of patents on minor improvements to their drugs and then list
those patents in the Orange Book. 1 ' These small improvements (such as
different excipients, changes in dosage, and different drug-delivery strate-
gies) then protect that form of the drug for an additional patent term.112
III. EXPLORING THE PARADOX
For over two decades, brand name plaintiffs in ANDA patent infringe-
ment lawsuits have argued that generic products infringe on their patents
under the doctrine of equivalents.xi 3 District courts recognized early on
that an "admission of bioequivalence is not an admission of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. They are two distinct concepts."11 4 The
question was first addressed by the Federal Circuit in 1999.115 A subse-
quent decade of Federal Circuit cases addressed the question of infringe-
ment by equivalents without any comment on the paradox of the
seemingly inconsistent requirements of bioequivalency and the doctrine
of equivalents. 116 The Federal Circuit finally commented on the issue in
111. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAw 170-78 (2012); Kate S.
Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29 NATURE BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 876, 876-78 (2011) (calculating the number of patents covering drugs listed in the
ORANGE BOOK between 2000 and 2010 and finding that most drugs are covered by multi-
ple patents, many of which are added to the Orange Book after the drug has come to
market); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Pat-
ents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 617-24 (2011); Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug
Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999); Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining
Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litiga-
tion, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1799 (2011).
112. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme
on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 258
(2005). However, note that new rules passed by the FDA in 2003 prohibited listing process
patents and patents claiming packaging, metabolites, or intermediaries. Applications for
FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements, 68
Fed. Reg. 36,677, 36,677 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
113. The first court opinion addressing the argument that a bioequivalent generic drug
might infringe on a brand name drug by equivalents was published in 1991. A.H. Robins
Co. v. Erbamont Inc., No. C2-89-864, 1991 WL 229150, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 1991),
vacated, 944 F.2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
114. Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharma. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (D. P.R. 1998), rev'd on
other grounds, 225 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
115. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
116. Federal circuit cases that addressed both bioequivalency and the doctrine of
equivalents in that decade include: Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d
1371, 1374-78 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd.,
476 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d
1196, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467
F.3d 1370, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 134 F. App'x 425,
429-30 (Fed. Cir. 2005); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm. Inc., 356 F.3d 1357,
1363-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1348,
1353-56 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1239-41
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., 323 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 262 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Biovail
Corp. Int'l v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Upjohn Co. v.
Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm.
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Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp., noting briefly that "FDA
equivalence is irrelevant to patent law because it involves fundamentally
different inquiries."" 7
The next year, the Federal Circuit commented more extensively on the
question of bioequivalence and legal equivalents in Abbott Laboratories
v. Sandoz, Inc."18 Abbott argued that the defendant had "effectively ad-
mitted infringement by equivalents when it claimed before the [FDA]
that its . .. generic was bioequivalent to Abbott's . . . product.""19 The
Federal Circuit was not persuaded by Abbott's argument. Its opinion
stated:
While bioequivalency may be relevant to the function prong of the
function-way-result test, bioequivalency and equivalent infringement
are different inquiries. Bioequivalency is a regulatory and medical
concern aimed at establishing that two compounds are effectively the
same for pharmaceutical purposes. In contrast, equivalency for pur-
poses of patent infringement requires an element-by-element com-
parison of the patent claim and the accused product, requiring not
only equivalent function but also equivalent way and result.120
The court worried that "[i]f bioequivalency meant per se infringement, no
alternative to a patented medicine could ever be offered to the public
during the life of a patent."121 The court thus concluded that "while po-
tentially relevant, the bioequivalency of an accused product with a prod-
uct produced from the patent at issue is not sufficient to establish
infringement by equivalents."1 2 2
Although bioequivalence involves a different inquiry than patent
equivalence, navigating between the two types of equivalences is never-
theless challenging for industry and courts. In AstraZeneca Pharmaceuti-
cals LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., AstraZeneca patented Diprivan, a
mixture of injectable anesthetic and EDTA, an antimicrobial compound
added to improve the shelf-life of the product.123 The generic companyl 24
set out to develop a generic formulation of Diprivan.125 It settled on a
formulation that mixed the anesthetic with DTPA, a compound similar to
the EDTA used in Diprivan.126 An internal memorandum pushed DTPA
Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1250-54 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm.,
Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1340-42 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pharmacia, 170 F.3d at 1373, 1378-79.
117. 543 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118. 566 F.3d 1282, 1296-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
119. Id. at 1298.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D. Ill.
2007)).
122. Id.
123. Nos. 02 Civ.7936 WHP, 03 Civ.6487 WHP, 2005 WL 2864666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
2, 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom, Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma
(USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
124. The company was not the defendant because the product had been licensed before
the litigation. Id. at *4.
125. Id. at *5.
126. Id.
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as a promising substitute because, among other things, the anesthetic
mixed with DTPA matched the pharmacokinetic profile of Diprivan,
meaning it could be approved without submitting additional studies to
the FDA. Moreover, the senior scientist working on the project stated in
the memorandum that she believed the new product would not infringe
the Diprivan patent.127 This narrative reveals a very conscious effort to
create a product that was bioequivalent but not legally equivalent. The
generic company almost got it right. The FDA did approve the product as
bioequivalent; however, the court found that the product infringed on
Diprivan by equivalents.128
A. SEARCH STRATEGY
To study how courts, the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA have
dealt with the intersection of the doctrine of equivalents and bioe-
quivalence, I analyzed all cases involving ANDAs and the doctrine of
equivalents up to the end of 2011. To find all cases involving ANDAs and
the doctrine of equivalents, I conducted the following search in Westlaw's
ALLFEDS129 database:
("doctrine of equivalent*" "substitution of equivalent*" "function-
way-result" (infring! wl3 equivalent*) "triple identity" "equivalently
infring!" "infring! by equivalent*" "equivalent infringement" Festo
"Graver Tank" "Warner-Jenkinson" 291k237) and (ANDA "abbre-
viated new drug application" "hatch-waxman" "waxman-hatch"
"bioequivalenc!" "FDA equivalence" "505(j)" "355(j)" cmax tmax
auc pharmacokinetic* bioavailable!).
The search, conducted on January 15, 2012, returned 187 cases. I
scanned each result, discarding cases that mentioned the doctrine of
equivalents only in passing or did not reach the issue. I ended up with
sixty-four cases, divided into twenty-one Federal Circuit cases and forty-
three district court cases. I read each case and discarded cases that dealt
with the doctrine of equivalents only through its limitations (prosecution
history estoppel or prior art) rather than reaching the merits of the argu-
ment. That left me with eight Federal Circuit cases and twenty-five dis-
trict court cases that analyzed the substance of whether a generic drug
infringed on a brand name drug's patent by equivalents. The earliest case
was decided in 1991,130 the second in 1996,131 and the bulk of the cases in
the twenty-first century.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *22. The case was appealed to the Federal Circuit, which upheld the District
Court's holding of infringement by equivalents but overturned it on other grounds. Abraxis
Bioscience, 467 F.3d at 1382-83.
129. ALLFEDS includes all federal cases since 1790. I did not search state cases be-
cause both patents and ANDAs are matters of federal law, and thus are unlikely to be
dealt with in state court.
130. A.H. Robins Co. v. Erbamont, Inc., No. C2-89-864, 1991 WL 229150, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 18, 1991), vacated, 944 F.2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
131. Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050, 1057
(S.D. Fla. 1996).
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The Federal Circuit has been favorable towards district courts' analyses
of the doctrine of equivalents. Of the eight cases that were appealed,
seven reached the issue of the doctrine of equivalents and only one was
reversed on equivalents grounds. 132 Although this is a low rate of reversal
relative to claim construction cases, the numbers are too small to draw
broad conclusions about the reversal rate.13 3 The low reversal rate, how-
ever, is interesting in light of the Federal Circuit's general hostility to-
wards the doctrine of equivalents during that period.134
The plaintiffs won in one-third of the ANDA doctrine of equivalents
cases, which is somewhat higher than the percentage of plaintiff wins in
all doctrine of equivalents cases and the percentage of wins in all biotech
and pharmaceutical doctrine of equivalents cases.135
B. ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF CHANGES
Equivalence paradox cases are rarely aimed at the central drug pat-
ent-the patent covering the active ingredient of the drug. Rather, the
generic work-arounds are primarily aimed at the commercialization and
development aspects of the drug. This means that the controversy is
rarely about the patent on the drug itself, but instead on peripheral pat-
ents related to such things as formulation, stability, or packaging of the
drug. Of the cases I surveyed, only three cases focused on the active in-
gredient of the drug.136 Thirteen cases dealt with formulation (the inac-
tive ingredients used to make the pill, cream, or injection). 3 7 Four cases
132. Bio Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 325 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
2003). While the Federal Circuit reversed on claim construction grounds, the court still
mentions that the district court's doctrine of equivalents analysis was wrong: "Although in
its discussion of the doctrine of equivalents the [district] court stated that 'the patent con-
templates a particular order of pill ingestion within one package,'. . . we reject the restric-
tion." Id. at 1360. Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin Ltd., No. 2:05CV421, 2006
WL 1582412, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2006), was appealed and reversed because the plain-
tiff's patent was found invalid; therefore, the Federal Circuit did not reach the issue of
equivalents. See 499 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
133. District courts' claim construction is overturned at a rate of 34.5%. Moore, supra
note 31, at 233.
134. Allison & Lemley, supra note 60, at 966-67.
135. Although not statistically significant, the percentage of plaintiff wins in all doctrine
of equivalents cases is taken from Allison & Lemley, supra note 60. The percentage of
plaintiff wins in all pharmaceutical doctrine of equivalents cases is derived by adding the
percentage of wins of in pharmaceutical and biotechnology doctrine of equivalents cases as
listed in the appendix of Allison & Lemley's article. Id. at 966-67, 980-82.
136. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 767, 767-73 (N.D. 111. 2007) (brand
name drug: cefdinir anhydrate; generic drug: cefdinir monohydrate; court found no in-
fringement); Chiron Corp. v. SourceCF Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029-31 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (brand name drug: antibiotic concentrations of 60-200mg/mL; generic drug: concen-
trations of less than 60 mg/mL); court found no infringement); Marion Merrell Dow, 948 F.
Supp. at 1053-55 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (brand name drug: terfenadine acid metabolite; generic
drug: terfenadine pro-drug; court found no infringement).
137. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-4937, 2011 WL 4074116, at *8
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011), aff'd, 476 F. App'x 746 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (brand name drug: tizanidine
on beads; generic drug: tizanidine granulation; court found no infringement); Cephalon,
Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 729, 746-50 (D. Del. 2011) (brand name drug:
sodium bicarbonate; generic drug: potassium bicarbonate; court found no infringement);
Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., Nos. 98-7164 CIV, 00-7075 CIV, 2008 WL 4709251, at
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dealt with chemical synthesis' 38 or purity139 of the drug, and four cases
dealt with packaging of the drug.140
*29-34 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2008) (brand name drug: multi-particulate pellet form sur-
rounded by multi-layer membrane; generic drug: pellet that does not dissolve completely
during use, is not completely spherical, and is not completely enclosed by membrane; court
found infringement by equivalents); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 381,
423-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 281 F. App'x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (brand name drug: talc
and hydroxypropylmethylcellulose to stabilize core; generic drugs: other chemicals used to
stabilize core; court found no infringement); Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Abbott Labs., Nos. 04
C 8078, 05 C 1490, 2005 WL 3050608, at *19-23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2005), affd, 473 F.3d
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (brand name drug: drug mixed with "a pharmaceutically acceptable
polymer"; generic drug: drug mixed with glycerin monostearate; court found infringement
by equivalents); AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., Nos. 02 Civ.7936
WHP, 03 Civ.6487 WHP 2005 WL 2864666, at *20-23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom, Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharm (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (brand name drug: stabilized with disodium edetate; generic drug:
stabilized with diethylenetriaminepentaacetate; court found infringement by equivalents);
Janssen Pharm. N.V. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 374 F. Supp. 2d 263, 273-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), affd,
134 F. App'x 425 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (brand name drug: beads with diameter of 600-700um;
generic drug: beads with diameter of 700-800um; court found no infringement); Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1162-63 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(brand name drug: pregelatinized starch; generic drug: microcrystalline cellulose; court
found no infringement); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 288 F. Supp.
2d 562, 582-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (brand name drug: lubricant selected from stearyl fumarate
or hydrogenated vegetable oil; generic drug: lubricants sodium lauryl sulfate and glyceryl
behenate; court found no infringement); Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 158 F.
Supp. 2d 1318, 1325-33 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (brand name
drug: drug in admixture with wetting agent; generic drug: drug over core of sucrose and
starch; court found no infringement); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 2d
211, 214-16 (D.P.R. 1998), affd, 225 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (brand name drug: spray-
dried lactose making up 70% of composition; brand name drug: spray-dried lactose making
up 49% of composition; court found no infringement); Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v.
Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 265, 283-84 (D. Md. 1998) (brand name drug: stabilized
with ethanol; generic drug: stabilized with propylene glycol; court found infringement by
equivalents); A.H. Robins Co. v. Erbamont, Inc., No. C2-89-864, 1991 WL 229150, at *3-11
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 1991), vacated, 944 F.22d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (brand name drug: hy-
drophilic surfactant external to microcapsule; generic drug: meristic acid in shell wall of
microcapsule; court found no infringement).
138. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07-2762 (JAP), 2009 WL 1741571, at
*5 (D.N.J. June 18, 2009), vacated, 345 F. App'x 394 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (brand name drug:
enantiomers separated using high performance liquid chromatography; generic drug: enan-
tiomers separated using different methods; court found no infringement); SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. Civ.A.99-CV-4304, 2005 WL 941671, at *32 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2005) (brand name drug: process that could not be conducted in ether solvent;
generic drug: process that could be conducted in either solvent; court found no
infringement).
139. Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 810-12 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (brand
name drug: substantially all sumatriptan in first layer and substantially all naproxen in
second layer; generic drug:100% sumatriptan and 15% naproxen in first layer and 85%
naproxen in second layer; court found infringement by equivalents); Aventus, 2006 WL
1582412, at *5-6 (brand name drug: product "substantially free of other isomers"; generic
drug: product containing between 0.06% and 0.5% of isomer-1; court found infringement
by equivalents).
140. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., No. 01 C 1876, 2005 WL 2347221, at
*17-20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2005), rev'd, 471 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (brand name drug:
mixing drug with water to prevent degradation; generic drug: containers lined with resin to
prevent contact with degrading agent; court found no infringement); EKR Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus., 633 F. Supp. 2d 187, 202-04 (D.N.J. 2009) (brand name drug:
solution that is isotonic as packaged; generic drug: solution that is hypotonic as packaged
and accompanied by instructions for dilution to make it isotonic before delivery; court
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The emphasis generic companies place on work-arounds aimed at com-
mercialization and development is no coincidence. Rather, it is an inher-
ent feature of the equivalence paradox. Generic companies have a limited
intellectual space in which they can create work-arounds. The intellectual
space is bounded on one end by the brand name company's patent and,
on the other end, by the FDA's regulations. That is the nature of the
paradox: patent law requires generic companies to innovate a certain dis-
tance from the bounds of the patent, but FDA regulations require generic
companies to remain close to the brand name product.
Figure 1: The intellectual boundaries of "generic space"
Literally New





This feature of the paradox is described in Figure 1. A generic drug that
is identical to or insubstantially different from the brand name drug
would fall to the left of the figure-it would infringe either literally or by
equivalents. A generic drug that is too different from the brand name
drug would fall to the right of the figure and would not be considered
bioequivalent by the FDA. Thus, it could not be a generic but would in-
stead be classified as a new drug. Generic drugs thus have a limited "ge-
neric space" in which to innovate.
If the generic company seeks to create a work-around for an active
ingredient, the intellectual space in which generics can innovate is ex-
tremely narrow. A generic drug manufacturer cannot change the active
ingredient substantially from the active ingredient in the reference prod-
uct or else the FDA will not approve the drug.141 If the generic company
changes the active ingredient such that it performs a different function,
the drug would almost by definition not be bioequivalent because the
found infringement by equivalents); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 174 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 236-41 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (brand name
drug: first four to five pills contain estrogen, rest progestin/estrogen mix; generic drug: first
twenty-one pills contain progestin/estrogen mix, last seven pills contain estrogen; court
found no infringement); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 289,
292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (brand name drug: pill marked with transverse score notches; ge-
neric drug: pill marked with opposing score notches; court found infringement by
equivalents).
141. 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (2012).
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patient would experience a different effect. If the generic company
changes the active ingredient such that it performs the same function in a
different way, it is very unlikely that the generic would still achieve the
same bioavailability at a similar concentration, so it is very unlikely that
the drug would be bioequivalent. If the generic company changes the ac-
tive ingredient such that it performs the same function in the same way
but achieves a different result, the drug would very likely not be bioe-
quivalent (unless the result was within 80% to 125% of the brand name
drug's result, but arguably that would not constitute a substantially differ-
ent result).1 4 2
In general, the tests for bioequivalence and legal equivalence are con-
ducted on different levels-the former on the level of the entire drug
formulation's activity and the latter on the level of a particular ele-
ment.143 For changes to active ingredients, the tests are conflated.144
Bioequivalence looks at the performance of the active ingredient, and
legal equivalence also looks at the performance of the active ingredi-
ent. 14 5 Thus, it is extremely hard to make a change in the active ingredi-
ent that both satisfies the FDA and does not infringe by equivalents.
Conversely, a generic company has much wider latitude to make
changes to inactive ingredients. The changes in this category include sub-
stituting different binding agents, different wetting agents, different lubri-
cants, or different disintegrants or changing the coating around the
drug.146 These sorts of inactive ingredients are generally used to control
the way the drug is released once it is in the body.147 For example, a
disintegrant helps the drug break up into small pieces in the digestive
system so that it can be more easily dissolved, while a coating around a
drug might form a matrix that impedes drug release, so that the drug
escapes into the bloodstream slowly and creates an extended-release
effect.148
The FDA does regulate the types of excipients that may be changed
but allows a wide range of substitutes within certain numerical parame-
ters. 149 In addition, the generic must still meet the bioequivalence re-
142. See Acorda Therapeutics, 2011 WL 4074116, at *8.
143. See Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 729, 746 (D. Del. 2011)
(bioequivalence test conducted on formulation of the drug). But see Sanofi-Aentis, 2009
WL 1741571, at *5 (literal infringement test focused on the element of "optically pure
oxaliplatin").
144. See Merion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050,
1053 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (both legal equivalence and bioequivalence tests focused on the ac-
tive ingredient terfenadine).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1.
146. Id. § 320.33.
147. Id.
148. Michael Bihari, Extended-release Medication, ABOUT.com DRUGS, http://
www.drugs.about.com/od/edrugandmedicalterms/glext-release-def.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2012).
149. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SUB-




quirements, but there are many possible changes to inactive ingredients
that will not affect the pharmacokinetic profile of the drug. Therefore,
they have a better chance of avoiding infringement by equivalents. Ge-
neric companies won in eighty percent of the cases in this category, evi-
dencing that there is more space for generic companies to create work-
arounds when the brand name patent covers inactive ingredients than
when the patent covers active ingredients.
The effect of the FDA's aversion to changes to the active ingredient
and openness to changes to inactive ingredients is that the equivalence
paradox arises primarily in the context of commercialization and develop-
ment. Conceptually, this is illustrated in Figure 2.










In Figure 2, the diagram to the left represents the scope of the intellec-
tual space available for generic companies to create work-arounds when
the brand name patent covers the active ingredient of the drug. The ge-
neric space is narrow because the FDA does not allow a wide range of
changes to the active ingredient. The diagram to the right represents the
scope of the intellectual space available for generic companies to create
work-arounds when the brand name patent covers an inactive ingredient
of the drug. The generic space is considerably wider because the FDA
allows a wider range of changes to the inactive ingredients of the drug.
Thus, the FDA's bioequivalence requirements shift, depending on the
type of change in question, to make changes going to commercialization
and development more feasible for generic companies.
C. ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF PATENTS
The type of patent covering a brand name product affects the scope of
equivalents that the patentee can claim. In this section, I analyze the pat-
ents used to protect the products described in the cases above and draw
conclusions about which types of patents offer the most protection to
brand name companies under the doctrine of equivalents. Unsurprisingly,
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patents on the actual chemical entity are strongest while patents on the
method-of-use are the weakest.
The FDA divides patents into seven categories.150 However, the FDA
allows only three types of patents to be listed in the Orange Book: (1)
patents claiming a drug substance (the active ingredient); (2) patents
claiming the drug product (the formulation or composition); and (3)
method-of-use patents.15' Drug product patents cover "a finished dosage
form, for example, tablet, capsule, or solution, that contains a drug sub-
stance, generally, but not necessarily, in association with one or more
other ingredients." 15 2 Method-of-use patents can be listed only if they
claim a method of use that is in the labeling of the approved NDA.1 53 The
FDA also identifies four types of patents that cannot be listed in the Or-
ange Book. These are: (1) patents claiming packaging;154 (2) patents
claiming metabolites;155 (3) patents claiming intermediaries;15 6 and (4)
process patents.157
I identified the patents at issue in the doctrine of equivalents cases de-
scribed above and divided them according to the seven FDA categories. I
categorized the patents by reading the text of the patent and by looking
at the patent code listed in the Orange Book. 58 I also identified patents
that claim the actual chemical entity used as the active ingredient in the
drug. This sort of patent affords the most protection to brand name com-
150. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b).
151. See id.
152. Id. § 314.3(b).
153. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and
Listing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,681 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 314) ("If an NDA applicant or holder or patent owner intends to submit infor-
mation on a patent that claims a method of use, the patent must claim a use that is de-
scribed in the NDA. If we have already approved the NDA, the patent must claim a
method of use that is in the labeling of the approved NDA."). The FDA noted that this is a
long-standing policy. Id. (citing Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations: Patent &
Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,363-64 (Oct. 3, 1994)).
154. Packaging patents include only patents that claim solely packaging (e.g., a bottle or
container), and not packaging in combination with the drug product, such as a dosage form
(e.g., a tablet, capsule, or gel-form of a drug) or a drug delivery system (e.g., an inhaler or
transdermal patch). Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Sub-
mission and Listing Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,680. The rule clarifies the distinction
between packaging and dosage forms in response to comments concerned that "patents
claiming devices or containers that are 'integral' to the drug product or require FDA ap-
proval" would not be able to be listed. Id.
155. A metabolite patent is one claiming the by-product of a drug produced after the
drug has been metabolized by the body. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
156. An intermediary patent is one claiming "materials that are produced during prepa-
ration of the active ingredient and are not present in the finished drug." Applications for
FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements, 68
Fed. Reg. at 36,681.
157. Id.
158. Listings in the Orange Book are accompanied by a patent abbreviation describing
the patent (and type of exclusivity). A list of patent codes can be found at ADB1. A list of
drugs and their respective patent codes can be found beginning at ADAL. Note that not all
of the relevant products are listed in the Orange Book (some have been taken off the
market) and others are in the Orange Book but do not have a patent code (many patents
were invalidated in subsequent cases).
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panies, both because it is difficult for generic companies to develop a
work-around to the patent while maintaining bioequivalency, and be-
cause the Hatch-Waxman Act provides new chemical entities with at least
a four-year protection from challenges. 159
Note that as I categorized patents, I did not always follow the patent
code listed in the Orange Book when the functional use of the patent
placed it in a different category. For example, Treximet, the product at
issue in Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.,160 is covered by a patent
coded in the Orange Book as a drug product; 161 however, I categorized it
as a drug substance because the patent performs the same protective
function as a drug substance patent. Treximet is made up of two active
ingredients: naproxen and sumatriptan.162 These ingredients have long
been used for other functions, making the actual chemical entities no
longer patentable. However, Treximet combines the two active ingredi-
ents to create a novel medical product.163 Therefore, although Pozen
could not patent the active ingredient, it could-and did-patent the
combination of active ingredients, which gives it the same protection as a
drug substance patent.164 Thus, it is the functional equivalent of a drug
substance patent.
After placing each patent into a category, I counted the number of pat-
ents that fell into more than one category. Although each claim can be
directed towards only one category, each patent contains multiple claims,
and different claims may be directed at different categories. In addition,
an individual product was often protected by multiple patents, with dif-
ferent patents falling into different categories. Thus, in addition to the
FDA's categories, I also have "combination" categories. For example, if
one of the drug's patents claimed methods for making an extended-re-
lease formulation of the drug, while another patent claimed a combina-
tion of the drug and the excipients needed to get the extended release
profile, I categorized the drug as having a combination drug product and
process patent. Only product/process and product/method combinations
were present in my data set. Although most "drug substance" patents
also contained claims directed at formulations, processes, and methods, I
did not include drug substance patents in the combination categories be-
cause the active ingredient claim is the patent's strongest claim, and the
other claims offer less protection and are thus less relevant to a doctrine
of equivalents analysis.
159. The period is four years if the generic firm files a Paragraph IV certification; other-
wise, it is five years. This can increase if the brand name company does clinical trials in
particular patient populations, such as children. See Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Re-
lated to Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implica-
tions for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 602, 612-15
(2005).
160. 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
161. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 81, at 3-303.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra Figure 2.
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Figure 3 shows the percentage of drugs protected by each category of
patent. Most drugs (fifty-nine percent) are protected by a drug product
patent (alone or in combination with another category). The second most
common type of patent was a method-of-use patent (alone or in combina-
tion with a product patent). Seventeen percent of drugs are protected by
a drug substance patent. Few drugs were protected by process, metabo-
lite, or intermediary patents, and no drugs were protected by packaging
patents, perhaps because these are the types of patents that cannot be
listed in the Orange Book.
I then determined how many patents in each category were able to
protect their drug through the doctrine of equivalents. The results are
displayed below:
Figure 4: Likelihood of Winning Doctrine of Equivalents Cases Based
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Figure 4 shows the percentage of doctrine of equivalents cases won by the
plaintiff, categorized by type of patent. Plaintiffs whose drugs were pro-
tected only by a metabolite or intermediary, process, or method-of-use
patent never won a doctrine of equivalents case. Plaintiffs whose products
were protected by a drug substance patent won frequently (seventy-five
percent of cases)-an expected result because patents covering the active
ingredient are the strongest type of patent. Plaintiffs whose products were
protected by a drug product patent won at a rate of twenty-five
percent. 165
Plaintiffs who protected their product with more than one type of claim
increased their level of protection. Products protected by both product
and method claims obtained slightly more protection, winning one-third
of infringement cases, slightly above average. Products protected by both
product and process claims obtained a great deal more protection, win-
ning two-thirds of infringement cases, well above average. A caveat is
that these patents afford the strongest protection for patentees arguing
the doctrine of equivalents. Stronger patents may not be challenged at all
by an ANDA, or may win on literal infringement.
There are two important policy conclusions to be drawn from this data,
both of which relate to evergreening.166 First, scholars have suggested
that courts are losing patience with evergreening patents and are treating
them with more skepticism.167 The difference in win-rates based on pat-
ent type is empirical evidence of this suggestion. Drug substance patents
cover the active ingredient of the drug and are the core patents protecting
it. As such, they are almost never evergreening patents. Product, process,
packaging, metabolite, and intermediary patents may be evergreening
patents. Where a drug is covered by only one patent, courts are strongly
favorable to drug substance patents-giving them a wide scope of
equivalents and holding that they are infringed at a rate of seventy-five
percent. Courts are notably less favorable to drug product patents-giv-
ing them a narrow scope of equivalents and holding that they are in-
fringed only at a rate of twenty-five percent.
However, the second conclusion to be drawn from the data is that al-
though courts may be increasingly skeptical of evergreening patents,
evergreening is still an effective strategy. One form of evergreening is
"stacking patents" by covering a drug with multiple patents or by altering
the formulation of a drug and then pulling the old drug from the mar-
ket.168 The graph above demonstrates that this multiple-patenting ap-
165. See supra Figure 4.
166. See discussion infra Part V.
167. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 356 (2007) ("[Tjhe courts grow more skeptical of ever-
greening strategies .... ).
168. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87
TEX. L. REV. 685, 711 (2009) ("After Congress corrected that particular [evergreening]
problem, crafty firms took a different tack: rather than stacking patents, they stacked prod-
ucts-making trivial changes to their product formulation and pulling the old drug from
the market.").
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proach appears to work. While products covered only by drug product
patents win only twenty-five percent of the time, drug companies can in-
crease their win rate to sixty-five percent by covering their product with
multiple patents.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PARADOX
Why do the equivalence cases come out the way they do? What guid-
ing principle explains the differences in courts' decisions? Here, I search
for a normative or theoretical basis to explain the outcomes and predict
future cases-a micro theory. 169 First, I explain why the mere words of
the doctrine of equivalents tests are insufficient to explain and predict
courts' decisions. Then I propose that courts look (perhaps uncon-
sciously) at whether the generic work-around adds some commercial
value over the brand name company's invention and that this concept of
added value can be used to explain and predict the outcomes in equiva-
lence paradox cases.
The mere words of the doctrine of equivalents tests are insufficient to
explain and predict courts' decisions. Courts use one of two etymological
frameworks.170 They may use the "function-way-result" test, which asks
whether the accused product performed substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result.171
Alternatively, courts may look at whether there are "insubstantial differ-
ences" between the two products.172 To be sure, courts organize their
opinions around these linguistic tests.173 But what is an "insubstantial dif-
ference"? What is the difference between "substantially the same func-
tion" and "insubstantially the same function"? Mere words unconnected
to a concrete concept cannot explain where the line between "substan-
tial" and "insubstantial" falls.
Compare, for example, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuti-
cals USA, Inc.174 with Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Pharmadyne Corp. 75 In
Bristol, the plaintiff made Monopril, an anti-hypertension drug.176 Bris-
tol's patent claimed a tablet "comprising of about 0.3% to 4% of a lubri-
cant selected from sodium stearyl fumarate or hydrogenated vegetable
169. I draw my terminology from A. Samuel Oddi's description of "macro level" theo-
ries, which "describe the overall patent system," and "micro level" theories, which "de-
scribe the patent system at a micro level in terms of explaining the outcome of actual
patent validity decisions." A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-
The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 268-69 (1996).
170. "[T]he particular linguistic framework used to determine 'equivalence'. . . is less
important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry. " Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19 (1997).
171. Id. at 35.
172. Id. at 39-40.
173. Id. at 39 ("Both the parties and the Federal Circuit spend considerable time argu-
ing [which] approach is better.").
174. 288 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
175. 32 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D. Md. 1998).
176. Bristol, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
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oil." 1 7 7 Teva's product used sodium lauryl sulfate and glyceryl behenate
as lubricants.17 8 Because the lubricants were different, Teva's product did
not literally infringe. 179 Bristol-Myers Squibb alleged that Teva infringed
by equivalents.180
The court held that Teva did not. 81 The lubricants did serve substan-
tially the same function.182 However, they did so in a substantially differ-
ent way because (1) Teva used two lubricants, while Bristol-Myers Squibb
used one; (2) Teva used a combination of water-insoluble lubricant and
water-soluble lubricant, whereas Bristol-Myers Squibb used only water-
soluble lubricant; and (3) Teva's lubricant made up 6.4% of the formula-
tion by weight, which was more than the 4% limit in Bristol-Myers
Squibb's patent.183 These are "substantial" differences.
A facially similar case, Glaxo v. Pharmadyne,184 turned out differently.
Glaxo manufactured Zantac, a medication used to treat heartburn and
ulcers.'85 Zantac combined the active ingredient with ethanol, an antimi-
crobial placed in the solution to preserve shelf life.18 6 Pharmadyne's ge-
neric product combined the active ingredient with propylene glycol,
which acted as the antimicrobial.187 Glaxo sued Pharmadyne for patent
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 88 The court found that
Pharmadyne developed its product by copying Glaxo's patent, and did
little independent research beyond testing polyol-alcohols to determine
which had similar effects to ethanol. 189 The court held that Pharmadyne's
product infringed by equivalents because this was an "insubstantial"
difference.190
Why is substituting two lubricants for one a substantial difference while
substituting an alcohol for a polyol-alcohol not? This paper argues that
the answer lies in the value of the substitution. The court in Bristol fin-
ished its opinion by explaining that the generic product did not achieve
substantially the same result as the brand name product because the ge-
neric product prevented sticking and picking in long tableting runs,
whereas the brand-name lubricant could have resulted in sticking, making
the generic formulation "superior" and thus precluding infringement.'91
The court's use of the term "superior" is significant. Nothing in doctrine
of equivalents jurisprudence requires courts to consider the superiority of
177. Id. at 565.
178. Id. at 572.
179. Id. at 588.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 589.
183. Id. at 582-83.
184. Glaxo, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
185. Id. at 269.
186. Id. at 277-79.
187. Id. at 282.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 283.
190. Id. at 291.
191. Bristol, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
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the defendant's product. Yet the court here did so, and found that the
defendant's formulation did not infringe because it improved on the
brand name product in a way that made manufacturing more efficient.192
Although other courts do not use the language of superiority, the same
concept undergirds their opinions. In my analysis of the equivalence para-
dox cases, I found that the most coherent way to explain the results of the
cases was to ask whether the generic product's change added value.
"Value" is a difficult term to define, but it correlates with an increase in
commercial value, meaning that the product might improve patient
safety, make the drug easier to produce, or make the drug more marketa-
ble. Changes that did not add value often actually decreased the commer-
cial value of the product by making it less safe, harder to produce, or less
marketable.
To analyze my hypothesis, I separated the equivalence cases based on
whether the generic product added value. 193 In all of the cases where the
generic product added value, the court found that the product did not
infringe on the brand name patent.194 In two-thirds of the cases where the
generic product did not add value, the court found that the product did
infringe on the brand name patent.195
The concept of "added value" is best explained by reference to cases.
192. Id.
193. I wish to note that my categorization is in no way scientifically replicable. A differ-
ent researcher may come to a different conclusion about the placement of specific cases.
However, I believe that while others may categorize a case or two differently, my overall
conclusion would hold.
194. Arcorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-4937, 2011 WL 4074116, at *8
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011), affd, No. 2012-1019, 2012 WL 2086719 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2012);
Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07-2762(JAP), 2009 WL 1741571, at *1
(D.N.J. June 18, 2009); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. Civ.A.99-CV-
4304, 2005 WL 941671, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2005); Abbot Labs. v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 2d 882, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Chiron Corp. v. SourceCF, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 2d 1019, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Abbot Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., No. 01C
1876, 2005 WL 2347221, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2005); Janssen Pharm. N.V. v. Eon Labs.
Mfg., 374 F. Supp. 2d 263, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 134 F. App'x 425 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Bristol, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 562; Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d
1381, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Upjohn Co. v. Mova
Pharm. Corp. 311 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D.P.R. 1998), aff'd, 225 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
195. Cases where the generic did not add value and was found to infringe: Bio-Tech.
Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pham., Inc., 325 F.3d 1356, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); ); Pozen Inc. v.
Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 825 (E.D. Tex. 2011); EKR Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sun
Pharm. Indus. 633 F. Supp. 2d 187, 207 (D.N.J. 2009); Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc.,
Nos. 98-7164CIV, 00-7075, 2008 WL 4709251, at *73 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2008); Aventis
Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin Ltd., No. 2:05CV421, 2006 WL 1582412, at *1 (E.D.
Va. June 5, 2006); Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Abbott Labs., Nos. 04 C 8078, 05 C 1490, 2005 WL
3050608, at *31 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2005), aff'd, 473 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007); AstraZeneca
Pharm. LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., No. 02 CIV.7936 WHP, 2005 WL 2864666, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part, 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Mead
Johnson & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 289, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1999 Glaxo, 32 F.
Supp. 2d at 293; A.H. Robins Co. v. Erbamont, Inc., No. C2-89-864, 1991 WL 229150, at
*21 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 1991), vacated, 944 F.2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Cases where the
generic did not add value and was not found to infringe include: Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 729, 761 (D. Del. 2011); Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 486 F.
Supp. 2d 767, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 490 F. Supp. 381, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 281 F. App'x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bristol-Myers Squipp Co. v.
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Take, for example, Chiron Corp. v. SourceCF Inc. 196 and Abbott Labora-
tories v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,197 both of which demonstrate added
value. In Chiron, the plaintiff produced TOBI, a nebulizer that can de-
liver tobramycin (an aerosolized antibiotic) to patients suffering from cys-
tic fibrosis.198 Chiron obtained a patent to prevent any other companies
from making a nebulizer that delivers tobramycin at concentrations be-
tween 60-200 mg/ml.199 Over time, other companies developed more effi-
cient nebulizers, but Chiron used its patent to prevent them from using
their improved nebulizers to administer tobramycin at the relevant con-
centrations. 200 The defendant, SourceCF, developed TOFIN-a method
of administering tobramycin at concentrations lower than 60 mg/ml.201
Chiron sued for patent infringement, both literally and by equivalents. 202
The court held that TOFIN did not literally infringe because the con-
centration of tobramycin was lower than 60 mg/ml. 2 0 3 On the question of
equivalents, although SourceCF's witness testified that TOFIN was de-
signed to deliver a dose "equivalent" to that of TOBI, the court found
that the equivalent result did not mean that the result was achieved in the
same way.2 0 4 The court reasoned that Chiron never tested lower concen-
trations of tobramycin, but the defendants found a way to effectively use
the lower concentrations; therefore, the two products must be functioning
in different ways.205 Thus, TOFIN did not infringe by equivalents.
Essentially, the court in Chiron relied on the added value of the defen-
dant's product. The court could not explain the differences between the
two products, which generally leads courts to decide that the plaintiff can-
not prove its case based on lack of evidence.206 However, here the court
Andrx Pharm., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Marion Merrell Dow Inc.
v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
196. Chiron, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
197. Abbott, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
198. Chiron, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
199. Id. at 1021.
200. Id. at 1020-21.
201. Id. at 1024.
202. Id. at 1025.
203. Id. at 1034.
204. Id. at 1037-38.
205. Id. at 1038.
206. See, e.g., Cephalon, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 747-49. Plaintiff's product Fentora, consist-
ing of fentanyl buccal tablets, was used to treat breakthrough pain in cancer. Id. at 734. The
tablet was given sublingually and evolved gas by means of an effervescent reaction to in-
crease the rate of absorption across the oral mucosa. Id. at 736. Cephalon used sodium
bicarbonate to create effervescence and alleged that Watson's product used potassium bi-
carbonate to do the same. Id. at 746. However, Cephalon only alleged that Watson's tablets
were "bioequivalent to Fentora" and did not provide any evidence about the nature of the
chemical reaction that would occur. Id. at 747-48. Moreover, Cephalon did not provide any
experiments determining the rate or extent of absorption of the drug across the oral mu-
cosa. Id. at 747. The court therefore found that there was no evidence of infringement. Id.
In In re Omeprazole, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 381, the plaintiff's product was Prilosec, which was
made of omeprazole, a proton pump inhibitor that slowed gastric acid secretion and could
be used to treat ulcers. Id. at 392. The plaintiffs brand name product was an oral
omeprazole formulation that attained resistance from gastric acids and stability through
the addition of various alkaline salt mixtures and water soluble coatings. Id. at 392-93. The
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relied on the defendant's added value-the ability to deliver an
equivalent dose at lower concentrations-to conclude that there must be
a substantial difference. 207 The court was not relying on the words of the
doctrine of equivalence test, because it could not pinpoint why there was
a substantial difference in the "way" the drug functions; nevertheless, the
court concluded that there was such a difference.208
The importance of value is also apparent in Abbott. Here, Abbott Lab-
oratories produced an inhalable anesthetic made of sevoflurane. 209
Sevoflurane can degrade when it is exposed to a Lewis acid, creating
hydrocholoric acid as a by-product. 210 Hydrochloric acid is toxic; there-
fore, degraded sevoflurane cannot be used in humans.211 Lewis acids are
often found in the containers used to hold sevoflurane during its trans-
portation.212 Abbott's scientists discovered that adding water to
sevoflurane neutralizes the Lewis acid in the container and prevents deg-
radation.213 Abbott patented "a quantity of sevoflurane and a Lewis acid
inhibitor in an amount effective to prevent degradation by a Lewis
acid." 214
Baxter Healthcare also sold sevoflurane.215 To get around the problem
of degradation, Baxter packaged its sevoflurane in containers lined with
epoxy phenolic resin.216 This lining prevented the sevoflurane from con-
tacting the container (and thus from contacting Lewis acids). Therefore,
the sevoflurane did not degrade.217 Abbott alleged that Baxter's product
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 218 The court held, however,
that the products were not equivalent because the two products did not
operate the same way.219 Baxter's lining physically blocked sevoflurane
from contacting Lewis acids, whereas Abbott's product used water to re-
act with the Lewis acids to neutralize them.220 Therefore Baxter's product
did not infringe.221 Although the court used only the function-way-result
language, the value of Baxter's product is apparent.
generic products used different chemicals to stabilize the omeprazole. Id. at 425. The plain-
tiff argued that this infringed by equivalents. Id. The court did not discuss the question in
detail, instead finding that the plaintiff had not produced enough evidence to show that the
other chemicals performed the same function in substantially the same way to produce the
same results. Id. at 447-48. The court therefore held for the defendant. Id.
207. Chiron, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
208. Id.
209. Abbott, 2005 WL 2347221, at *1.
210. Id. at *1-2.
211. Id. at *2.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *3.
214. Id. at *4.
215. Id. at *17.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *20.
218. Id. at *14.
219. See id. at *19-20.
220. Id. at *20.
221. Id.
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Conversely, generic companies that make changes that do not increase
value are generally found to infringe by equivalents. In Mead Johnson &
Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the plaintiff made tablets of Desyrel
Dividose, an antidepressant.222 The product contained transverse score
marks along the tablets to help the patient break the tablet into multiple
subdosages. 223 Barr's generic product also contained score markings to
facilitate tablet breakage; 224 however, Barr's tablets had two pairs of op-
posing score notches instead of a transverse score mark. 2 2 5 Barr admitted
that these score marks were, like Mead's score marks, directed at ena-
bling a patient to break the pill.2 2 6
The court analyzed the infringing product using the function-way-result
test.2 2 7 Both designs had the function of facilitating the fracturing of the
tablet into equal dosages.228 Both products did this through directing
pressure applied by the patient to achieve a more uniform fracturing. 229
Both products had the same result: fractured tablets.230 Thus, Barr in-
fringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 231
Although the court used the function-way-result language, the lan-
guage alone does not necessitate the result. The court could have found
that the tablets functioned a different way, based on the differences in
design that facilitate breakage. But this result would have been absurd. It
is evident that while Barr made changes, these changes were not substan-
tial because the change lacked value. The change from score marks to
notches did not make the product safer, more efficient, or easier to manu-
facture. The change was simply designed to evade a patent and added no
other redeeming value.2 3 2
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin Ltd. is a similar case. 2 3 3
In this case, the plaintiff produced Altace, a medication used to treat high
blood pressure. 234 The plaintiff's patent covered the active ingredient
"substantially free of other isomers." 235 Isomers are a form of impu-
rity.236The defendant's ANDA product was composed of the active ingre-
222. 38 F. Supp. 2d 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
223. Id. A transverse score is defined by the court to mean "two or more notches, lines,
grooves or scratches that run continuously and uninterrupted on the same surface from
edge to edge." Id.







231. Id. at 293-94.
232. We task generic companies with designing work-arounds to patents to provide
drugs to the public at a lower price; therefore, designing around a patent has significant
social benefits.
233. No. 2:05CV421, 2006 WL 1582412, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2006).
234. Id. at *1-2.
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id. at *8 n.7.
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dient and contained between 0.06% and 0.5% by weight of isomer-1. 237
The court analyzed infringement under the function-way-result test 3 8
Because low levels of isomer-1 had no effect on the drug, the products, in
the opinion of the court, worked the same way.239 Additionally, both
products treated hypertension; therefore, they had the same result.2 4 0 'he
court concluded that the generic infringed by equivalents. 241
As in Mead, the language of the doctrine of equivalents test did not
require this result. The court could have concluded that the products de-
livered different results because the plaintiff's product delivered a slightly
purer drug than the defendant's product. Yet this is not a substantial dif-
ference because reducing the purity of the drug did not add value to the
drug; in fact, it slightly diminished its value. Once again, the value of the
change helps explain the court's conclusion.
The use of value as a proxy for "substantialness" fits intellectually with
the Federal Circuit's use of commercial success as a secondary considera-
tion of obviousness.242 Courts look at secondary considerations, in part,
because it is difficult to determine obviousness during patent prosecution
because this necessitates a consideration of the foreseeability of the tech-
nology.243 Obviousness decisions are particularly difficult in pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology cases because life sciences are more
"unpredictable" than other industries.244
Similarly, the doctrine of equivalents requires judges or juries 245 to
consider, among other things, the purpose of the feature in the overall
patent, its qualities when combined with other features, its function, and
whether a person reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of the two technologies at issue.246 Particularly chal-
lenging is the question of whether the defendant's technology is an "un-
anticipated equivalent[ ]."1247 Essentially, the trier of fact must determine
whether the defendant's substitution was foreseeable to the patentee.
237. Id. at *2.




242. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Van-
denburg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kansas Jack, Inc. v.
Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Fed-
eral Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989). This ap-
proach, however, is criticized by some scholars. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 56 (2008); see, e.g.,
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 809 (1988); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1520 (2002).
243. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 13-15 (2010).
244. Computer science is, for example, "predictable. " Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERK. TECH L.J. 1155, 1157 (2002).
245. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)
(stating that equivalency is a matter of fact).
246. Id.
247. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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This is a determination in many ways analogous to a determination of
nonobviousness in a suit over patent validity; therefore, the use of a sec-
ondary consideration such as value is reasonable. 24 8
Although the number of equivalence paradox cases appealed to the
Federal Circuit is low, the general trend suggests that the Federal Circuit
approves of the district courts' handling of equivalence paradox cases.
Eight equivalence paradox cases have been appealed to the Federal Cir-
cuit since 2000.249 Of these, one was vacated on unrelated grounds,250 one
was reversed on doctrine of equivalents grounds, 251 and six were
upheld.252
The case reversed on doctrine of equivalents grounds supports the the-
ory that courts decide cases based on added value. 2 5 3 In Bio-Technology,
the plaintiff produced Mircette, an oral contraceptive. 254 The contracep-
tive package was designed such that the first pill would be taken at the
onset of menstruation.255 The first week of pills contained estrogen.256
The remaining pills contained a mix of estrogen and progestin.257 After
twenty-eight days, the package would be empty, and the woman would
take a new package and begin the cycle again. 258 The patent outlined this
two-stage system.259 Duramed's generic oral contraceptive reversed this
system. 2 6 0 Menstruation would begin on about day twenty-one of the
package.261 For the first three weeks (before menstruation), the woman
would take a pill containing a mix of estrogen and progestin.262 After the
onset of menstruation, the woman would take the last pills in the pack-
age, which contained only estrogen.263 She would then take a new pack-
age and begin the cycle again.264 Thus, the two products contained
248. Both require determination of the foreseeability of a technology based on certain
prior facts.
249. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Abbott Labs. v.
Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH
v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma
(USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 429 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Eon Labs. Mfg., 134 F. App'x. 425
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Bio Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
250. Aventis, 499 F.3d at 1294-95 (reversing because plaintiff's patent was invalid with-
out reaching the issue of equivalence).
251. Bio Tech., 325 F.3d at 1364.
252. Sandoz, 566 F.3d at 1299; Andrx, 473 F.3d at 1198; Abraxis, 467 F.3d at 1373; Pfi-
zer, 429 F.3d at 1369; Janssen, 134 F. App'x at 427; Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1308.
253. See Bio Tech., 325 F.3d at 1364.
254. Bio Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.N.J.
2001), rev'd, 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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exactly the same number of pills of the same chemical composition and
were taken in the same order relative to menstruation. The only differ-
ence is in the order they were arranged in the package.
The district court held that defendant's product did not infringe by
equivalents. 265 The lower court explained that the ordering of the drugs
was a limitation of the patent 266 and held that reversing the ordering in
the package is a change that "is not insubstantial." 2 6 7 Although the dis-
trict court acknowledged that, over the course of several months, the wo-
men using the contraceptive would experience identical effects, it held
that the patent covered only one cycle, and thus the "generic version of
Mircette does not perform in substantially the same way to achieve sub-
stantially the same results as the patented system." 268 This case did not fit
with the value theory because a change in the ordering of the pills does
not make the drug more marketable or improve methods of manufactur-
ing and it might even make the drug less safe.2 6 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the case.270 Although it was
technically overturned on claim construction grounds,271 the appeals
court explained in dicta that the district court erred in its doctrine of
equivalents analysis, writing that "[a]lthough in its discussion of the doc-
trine of equivalents the court stated that 'the patent contemplates a par-
ticular order of pill ingestion within one package,' . . . we reject the
restriction." 2 7 2 Thus, at the Federal Circuit level, the case fits with the
value theory because a change in the ordering of the pills added no value,
and therefore the generic should be found to infringe.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROBLEMS IN PATENT LAW
There are two major debates on the topic of patent efficiency: (1)
whether patents provide sufficient incentives to innovate, and (2)
whether patents provide sufficient incentives to develop and commercial-
ize the patented invention? 273 The first question tracks the traditional
"reward" theory of patent law, which is an economic argument that pat-
ent rights are a reward for the innovation disclosed in the patent and an
ex ante incentive to innovate. 274 The second question tracks the "pros-
265. Id. at 241.
266. Id. at 240.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See infra notes 351-70 and accompanying text (exploring safety implications of
generic drugs).
270. Bio Tech., 325 F.3d at 1356.
271. This case was overturned on the basis that the district court erred in construing the
patent to cover only one cycle, because this was "a construction that would allow any
potential infringer to avoid liability through any of a number of elementary expedients,
such as cutting each of its monthly packages in two. " Id. at 1362.
272. Id. at 1360.
273. Benjamin Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 508-09 (2009).
274. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 439 (2004).
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pect" theory of patent law, which argues that patents are granted for the
ex post purpose of incentivizing a patentee to continue investing in com-
mercializing his product.275
In this section, I explain that the courts' "value" approach to the para-
dox focuses on ex post incentives and bears little relation to ex ante in-
centives. The emphasis on ex post incentives occurs for two reasons. First,
the equivalence paradox cases deal almost exclusively with aspects of a
drug aimed at commercialization and development. 276 Second, equiva-
lence paradox cases arise when the prospect function of patents fails. The
prospect function of patents is to incentivize the downstream commercial-
ization and development of drugs by giving patentees a monopoly.277
However, generic companies win equivalence paradox cases when they
improve on the commercialization and development efforts of the patent
holder. 278 This means that generic companies win when the patent no
longer sufficiently incentivizes its holder and outside competitors are able
to do a better job of commercialization and development. Thus, courts
are in a position to alter patent scope on a case-by-case basis, using the
equivalence paradox cases to help answer the timeless question of how
big a patent's scope must be to sufficiently incentivize downstream devel-
opment without adding deadweight loss.
With respect to ex ante incentives, I explain that, facially, the courts'
"value" approach to the paradox is an elegant answer to the problem of
ensuring that patents provide sufficient ex ante incentives to innovate and
disclose. I then argue that although this may be true in the context of
individual patents, the pharmaceutical industry functions on the basis of
patent portfolios, not individual patents; thus, the courts' calculus, in real-
ity, does not correlate with ex ante incentives. This is important for schol-
ars and policy makers because recognizing that the pharmaceutical
industry functions on a patent portfolio basis may enable courts to ad-
dress ex ante incentives within the framework of current decisions.
I begin my discussion with ex post incentives because they are the focus
of the courts' analysis. Then, I conclude with an explanation of why the
courts cannot use equivalence paradox cases to perform a similar func-
tion for ex ante incentives.
A. Ex POST INCENTIVES
Ex post incentives are a problem in patent law. The most traditional
patent models explain that patents are rewards for the innovation re-
quired to produce the patent and for the disclosure in the patent.279 This
conception of patent law "essentially ignore[s] all but the beginning of the
275. Id. at 440.
276. See supra Part III.
277. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
278. See supra Part III.
279. Oddi, supra note 169, at 274.
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[innovation] process." 280 The most widespread response to this "reward"
based theory of patent law is Edmund Kitch's prospect theory.281 Kitch
recognized that the patent system gives innovators early and broad pat-
ents that are actually greater than the reward theory would necessitate. 282
On the basis of this conclusion, Kitch theorized that the foundation for
patent law is actually ex post motivation, giving patentees "an incentive
to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear
that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
appropriable by competitors." 2 8 3 Kitch relied on Yoram Barzel's sugges-
tion that races to invent and commercialize are inefficient, 284 and argued
that the patent system could prevent such inefficiency by granting broad
patents that placed the patentee "in a position to coordinate the search
for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value." 285
Other scholars have also recognized the problem of ex post incentives
in patent law, worrying that the current structure of patent law does not
sufficiently address post-patenting development and commercializa-
tion.2 86 Some suggest that competition is the best spur to development of
a patent,287 while others propose specialized "commercialization patents"
aimed at post-patenting development. 288 Regardless of the specifics of
the proposal, all agree that patent law must address ex post incentives. 289
Once it has been established that patent law must be concerned with ex
post incentives, the next task is to determine the proper patent scope to
create optimal incentives. 290 Too broad a patent creates deadweight loss
in the form of an extended monopoly that forces higher prices on con-
sumers and stifles competition. Too narrow a patent may prevent useful
products from coming to market because the patent holder is insuffi-
ciently incentivized to develop them. This problem has been explored in
more detail in the context of determining the proper patent scope to cre-
280. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 348 (2010).
281. Kitch, supra note 29, at 268.
282. Id. at 267.
283. Id. at 276.
284. Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 352
(1968); see also Duffy, supra note 274, at 441-45.
285. Kitch, supra note 29, at 276.
286. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Towards a New Form of
Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1367-68 (2011); Michael Abramowicz &
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, N.Y.U. L. REV. 337,
337-43 (2008); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2007); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Market-
place for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 403 (2005); Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of
Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGs L.J. 65, 69 (2009); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707 (2001); F.
Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law of Economics of Present Patent-
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 65 (2003); Sichelman, supra note 280, at 343-53.
287. Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 843-44.
288. Sichelman, supra note 280, at 341.
289. See, e.g., id.; Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 843.
290. See Roin, supra note 273, at 509.
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ate optimal ex ante incentives. 291 This is a problem in the ex post context
as well.
Before I explain why and how courts' resolution of equivalence para-
dox cases is primarily aimed at ex post incentives, I will address an issue
of context. Traditionally, ex post development and commercialization re-
ferred to development and commercialization of the technology de-
scribed in one patent. 292 This is less obvious in the pharmaceutical
industry. Drug companies typically use patent portfolios, meaning that
they have many patents protecting one product.293 A drug may be pro-
tected by a patent covering its active ingredient and also by many other
patents protecting various aspects of its formulation, synthesis, and pack-
aging.294 Thus, the importance of ex post commercialization and develop-
ment is not necessarily apparent in relation to any one patent, but instead
is important with respect to the composition of the active ingredient.
When I use the term "drug" in this section, I refer to the finished product
on the market, which is typically the sum of a patent portfolio.
Equivalence paradox cases are primarily aimed at ex post incentives
because the majority of patents at issue in the cases deal with down-
stream commercialization and development of a drug. 2 9 5 As described
above, 296 only three of the twenty-five equivalence cases focus on the
active ingredient of the drug. The other cases deal with generic work-
arounds related to downstream commercialization and development. 297
This is an inherent aspect of equivalence cases because the FDA allows a
greater range of work-arounds for downstream changes to a drug, as op-
posed to changes involving the active ingredient. 298 Thus, courts are more
likely to be concerned with downstream development because that is the
issue at hand.
Furthermore, equivalence cases arise when there has been a failure in
downstream development. For courts to find infringement, two circum-
291. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1882 (1984). For further descriptions of efforts to balance incentives to innovation
with costs to society, see WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969); see also Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 127-77 (2003); David S.
Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to
Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1626-41 (2009); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting
Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 987 (1999); John F.
Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37,
45-49 (2004); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253, 300 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 525-42 (2001).
292. See Sichelman, supra note 280, at 374-76.
293. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5-6 (2005).
294. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.
296. See supra Part III.
297. See supra Part III.
298. See supra Part III.
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stances must be present. First, the generic company must have created an
innovation that improves the drug in some way, generally related to im-
proved commercialization and development. 299 Second, the brand name
company must have been unable to make and patent that improvement
themselves.300
Under prospect theory, patents are intended, in part, to encourage
downstream innovation by giving the patentee a monopoly to allow for
coordinated innovative efforts.301 In equivalence paradox cases, the pros-
pect function of patents worked to an extent because the drug had
reached the market; however, there comes a point where the patent's ex
post incentives are no longer sufficient to incentivize downstream innova-
tion. As a theoretical matter, the patent should end at that point. As a
practical matter, it is essentially impossible to correctly determine the
precise patent scope and length necessary to maximize the patentee's
downstream innovative potential without granting an excessive monopoly
and incurring deadweight loss. Thus, we compromise by creating an in-
flexible patent length and inflexible FDA market exclusivity that estimate
optimal patent monopolies.
Equivalence paradox cases essentially give the legal system a second
bite at the patent scope apple. Courts have a chance to view the competi-
tive landscape after the patent has been granted and ask whether the pat-
entee or the competitor is the better innovator. For every innovation,
there should be a point at which the patentee ceases to be the better
innovator and is overtaken by the competitor. I sketch this concept in
Figure 5, below.




299. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
300. Id.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 281-85.
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Figure 5 shows how innovation changes over time. Early on, the brand
name company that holds a broad "prospect" patent commercializes and
develops the product and brings it to market. But gradually, the incentive
to innovate fades. At some point, generic companies have a stronger in-
centive to innovate and begin to improve on the drug in valuable ways. 302
This is the point at which the patent should narrow because disallowing
the generic's improvement creates deadweight loss.
This is what happens in equivalence paradox cases. Generic companies
try to create work-arounds. Sometimes, these work-arounds are innova-
tive and improve the product. At other times, they involve little innova-
tion and may even make the product worse.303 When there is no valuable
innovation, the generic company loses. When there is valuable innova-
tion, the generic company wins, and the range of equivalents covered by
the brand name patent is narrowed; to do otherwise would allow dead-
weight loss from a patent that is no longer incentivizing innovation. As a
further benefit, this has the effect of incentivizing competition. There is
controversy regarding whether broad patents or competition is more ef-
fective at increasing downstream development. 304 Equivalence cases ex-
pand the scope of patents where broad patents are more effective and
narrow than in cases where competition is more effective.
B. Ex ANTE INCENTIVES
Under the utilitarian calculus of standard patent theory, a patent is an
incentive to innovate.305 The "reward" theory explains that a patent is an
incentive for ex ante innovation-in other words, it rewards the invention
that is disclosed in the patent and seeks to incentivize more such discov-
eries and disclosures. 306 This model of patent law creates an empirical
challenge: how much incentive is sufficient? Louis Kaplow's "ratio test"
requires that the optimal package to be granted to intellectual property
owners should be developed by providing "those rights that grant just
enough reward to induce . . . inventive or creative activity at the lowest
social cost possible."307 Too great of a reward to patent holders creates
deadweight loss, which is socially undesirable. Too little of a reward
reduces the incentive to innovate and creates social loss in the form of
302. See Kitch, supra note 29, at 268-72.
303. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin Ltd., No. 2:05CV421, 2006
WL 1582412, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2006).
304. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 761, 788-91, 796-97 (2002).
305. See Kitch, supra note 29, at 268-71.
306. Oddi, supra note 169, at 275. Oddi suggest that the reward theory is more properly
called the "patent-induced" theory to distinguish it from the "natural rights" theory of
patent law. Id. at 274-75. But as reward theory is commonly applied to Oddi's "patent-
induced" theory, I will use the reward terminology for the purpose of simplicity. The re-
ward theory is criticized for perceiving "little to no need to protect risky and costly post-
invention development and commercialization efforts." Sichelman, supra note 280, at 344.
307. Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 299 (2009).
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fewer inventions.308 Many articles have suggested ways to tailor patent
rights to address this problem. 309
On its face, the "value" approach taken by the courts to equivalence
cases seems to dovetail nicely with the reward theory as a way to tailor
patent scope based on initial innovative efforts. A patent that required a
great deal of innovation should get a greater reward: a broader patent. A
patent that required little innovation should get a smaller reward: a nar-
rower patent. More specifically, the patent scope should reflect whether
the innovation would have been disclosed to society in the absence of the
patent.
In equivalence cases, the courts are faced with two parties, each of
whom have put some level of innovating effort into creating a "highly
similar" product. In a sense, this faceoff helps answer the question of
whether the innovation would have been disclosed but-for the patent. If
the generic company did little more than copy the brand name company's
patent, then the court has no evidence that the invention would have
been developed but-for the patent. If the generic company improved on
the brand name product or, better yet, managed to achieve a level of
accomplishment that the brand name company could not, then it is evi-
dence that the innovation would still have been available to the public
but-for the brand name patent. Thus, in the latter situation, the brand
name company deserves a narrower patent.
Note that, even if a generic company improved on a patent, it does
necessarily not follow that the generic company could have created the
innovation without the disclosure provided in the patent. Many generic
companies use the brand name patent as a starting point for their re-
search.310 However, some generic work-arounds are quite independent of
the brand-name patents.311
For example, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
308. This is, of course, a simplification. Scholarly work has added many other dimen-
sions onto this calculus. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 868-69.
309. See generally Crane, supra note 307; sources cited supra notes 286-90. Note that
the concern over patent scope and monopoly power is related to the widespread debate
about property rights (which create a broad patent monopoly) versus liability rights (which
create narrower, more easily tailored rules). See e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser,
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 783, 786-88
(2007); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Infor-
mation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1742-43 (2007). This argument has its basis in the real prop-
erty law literature. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089
(1972); Ian Ayres & J. M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Lucian Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liabil-
ity Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REv. 601 (2001); Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liabil-
ity Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Carol M. Rose,
The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997).
310. See Tara Stuart, Has the Supreme Court Incorrectly Expanded § 271(e) (1) to Risk
Regulatory Taking?, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 216, 222 (2006).
311. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. Civ.A.99-CV-4304, 2005
WL 941671, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2005).
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SmithKline produced Paxil, a blockbuster anti-depression drug.312
SmithKline scientists conducted experiments to "identify processes suita-
ble for industrial scale production of" Paxil.313 They settled on a process
that could only be conducted in a non-ether solvent and obtained a pat-
ent on this process. 314 The defendants produced a similar medication us-
ing an ether solvent and, thus, did not literally infringe SmithKline's
patent.315 Although SmithKline also argued that defendants' process in-
fringed by equivalents, the court found the doctrine inapplicable because
the processes did not perform substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way. 3 1 6
In SmithKline, the generic company developed an entirely different
chemical synthesis process.3 17 Paxil is a blockbuster drug with an enor-
mous market value. It is clearly socially beneficial to develop a process to
produce Paxil on an industrial scale, as the brand-name company did. But
would society have received a process for industrial production of Paxil in
the absence of the brand name patent? The generic company's success at
developing an alternate patent provides some evidence to suggest that
the answer is yes. Thus, perhaps the scope of the brand name patent
should be somewhat narrower because society did not need to grant a
large monopoly to obtain the innovative effort and, therefore, society
should not bear a large deadweight loss.
A narrow patent for an easily worked-around innovation will not en-
tirely discourage innovation. The brand name company will still have a
patent on the process, and thus will still hold a monopoly while the ge-
neric company develops its work-around. Furthermore, the brand name
company will still hold a patent on its version of the process and thus will
be able to benefit. By using the "value" method of interpreting equiva-
lence paradox cases, courts can tailor patent scope to ex ante innovative
effort.
Although this is an elegant way of addressing the patent scope prob-
lem, this approach does not work in the pharmaceutical and biotechnol-
ogy industries. Tailoring an individual patent in an equivalence case as a
way to respond to ex ante incentives fails to address the larger question of
ex ante efforts to create the drug itself. This is because the high cost of
clinical trials means that pharmaceutical companies do not operate on a
one-product-one-patent model, but rather on a patent portfolio model.318
Pharmaceutical companies rarely, if ever, have only one patent cover-
312. Id. at *2, *15.
313. Id. at *2.
314. Id. at *3-5.
315. Id. at *32.
316. Id. at *5, *32-33.
317. Id. at *33.
318. The literature is increasingly addressing the issue of patent portfolios. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, Should Good Patents Come in Small Packages? A
Welfare Analysis of Intellectual Property Bundling, 24 INr'L J. INDUS. ORG. 931, 934 (2006);
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 293, at 1.
[Vol. 66102
2013] The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence 103
ing a drug.31 9 Instead, they will patent the "new chemical entity," which is
the active ingredient in the drug, and will also patent a variety of periph-
eral patents related to method-of-use, chemical synthesis, packaging, pu-
rity, stability, and formulation.320 The peripheral patents can be essential
to getting the drug to market. Namely, a patient generally cannot just
swallow the active ingredient-it must be formulated into a pill or injec-
tion, purified to ensure reliability and safety, and packaged to ensure sta-
bility prior to use.321 However, the peripheral patents are not the focus of
a brand-name pharmaceutical company. 322 That is to say, pharmaceutical
companies generally do not develop ways to package a drug if there is no
drug to package. 323 The new chemical entity patent forms the core of the
patent portfolio and requires the creation of a variety of other peripher-
ally patentable innovations during the commercialization process. 3 24
Thus, it makes little sense to look at the ex ante incentives to create a
peripheral patent. It is more coherent to look at whether the portfolio of
patents provides sufficient ex ante incentives for the pharmaceutical com-
pany to bring the drug through clinical trials. In the context of
SmithKline, the appropriate question is not whether a mass synthesis pro-
cess for Paxil would have been developed in absence of the brand name
patent, but whether Paxil would have made it to the market in the ab-
sence of its protective patent portfolio.
As explained above, 325 equivalence paradox trials involve the periph-
eral patents. Take, for example, a method of packaging: if a court consid-
ers the ex ante innovative effort required for its development, it will miss
the forest for the trees. While the patent protection may have incen-
tivized the development of the packaging, the packaging development
was more likely incentivized by the patent on the active ingredient-the
core patent. The research that led to the core patent was in turn incen-
tivized by the knowledge that the resulting drug would be protected not
merely by a patent on its active ingredient (which frequently expires
before the drug gets to market) but by an entire portfolio that would
extend the company's market monopoly. Put another way, the peripheral
patent was not only a reward for developing packaging, it was also a re-
ward for developing the drug itself.
Moving from the one-product-one-patent approach to a portfolio ap-
proach makes it clear why "value" analysis is much too narrow to fit with
the reward theory of patent law. The fact that the generic company devel-
oped a work-around for a peripheral patent does not necessarily mean
that it could have developed a work-around for the drug itself. Moreover,
319. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 293, at 5-6, 16-17.
320. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Phar-
maceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232-33 (2001).




325. See supra Part II.
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even if the generic company was capable of the intellectual, innovative
effort, the cost of clinical trials for a new drug is extraordinarily high, 326
which is one reason that strong patent protection is vital in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Thus, the equivalence analysis is ill-suited to consider
ex ante incentives. As a theoretical matter, patent law would be more
coherent if courts did consider the ex ante incentives for the entire port-
folio when analyzing equivalence cases.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROBLEMS IN FDA LAW
The courts' analysis of equivalence cases finds a theoretical home in the
ex post theories of patent law. However, equivalence cases implicate not
only patent law, but also the Hatch-Waxman Act and related FDA regu-
lation. There are two central areas of FDA law affected by these cases:
(1) evergreening and (2) the goal of cheaper, safer medicine. In this sec-
tion, I discuss how the equivalence cases are evidence that courts are be-
coming increasingly skeptical of evergreening patents. In addition, courts
may use their value calculus to differentiate between patents obtained
solely for the purpose of evergreening and patents that have some social
benefit. Next, I assess the effect of the equivalence paradox on the pri-
mary goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act: creating a generic pathway in order
to bring safe drugs at a low cost to the market quickly. I conclude that
although the paradox may fit with patent theory, it is contrary to the
goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and both courts and policy makers
should consider the conflicting incentives created by the various laws reg-
ulating the generic industry.
A. EVERGREENING
Evergreening, a much-discussed issue in pharmaceutical law,3 2 7 occurs
when a pharmaceutical company that has lost both FDA exclusivity and
patent protection on the active ingredient of its drug seeks to extend its
monopoly by protecting the drug with a series of peripheral patents that
allow for additional FDA exclusivity and further patent protection.328 In
particular, this practice allows a brand name company to list additional
patents in the FDA's Orange Book, which in turn allows the patentee to
sue manufacturers of generic versions of their product for infringement
and obtain thirty-month stays on the generic product's market entry.329
Newer statutes, such as the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act 3 3 0 and the 2009 Biologics Price Competi-
326. See Glasgow, supra note 320, at 255.
327. See sources cited supra note 111.
328. Gaudry, supra note 111, at 876-78.
329. See, e.g., Glasgow, supra note 320, at 233; Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 82 (2004); Christine S. Paine,
Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations By Slowing Generic Production
Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 488 (2003).
330. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003) (to
be codified 21 C.F.R. at 314). The preamble to the proposed rule acknowledged that the
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tion and Innovation Act (BCPIA),331 attempt to curb evergreening, but
abuses continue. 332
Evergreening is widely considered a negative behavior-an example of
pharmaceutical companies exploiting loopholes in legislation to achieve a
longer patent term than otherwise entitled.333 As a practical matter, ever-
greening is problematic because it delays the market entry of low-cost
generic drugs. As a theoretical matter, evergreening is problematic be-
cause it gives patent holders a greater reward than Congress determined
that they are entitled to and creates deadweight loss by preventing ge-
neric companies from entering the market.
However, the practice of patenting peripheral elements of a drug can
also be positive. With respect to ex ante incentives, Scott Hemphill points
out that a defense to pharmaceutical companies' strategic behavior is that
such behavior increases the reward for innovation and thus incentivizes
development of new drugs. 334 With respect to ex post incentives, to com-
mercialize a product, pharmaceutical companies must discover how to
synthesize the drug; how to purify it; how to stabilize it to ensure a shelf
life long enough for the drug to be shipped and used; how to create pack-
aging that does not react with the product and is safe for consumer use;
change was in response to "NDA holders submit[ting] new patents for listing shortly before
other listed patents for the same drug were to expire. " 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,677 (Oct. 24,
2002).
331. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The BCPIA includes an "anti-evergreen-
ing" provision-a list of improvements in a drug that do not qualify for an exclusivity
period-in an effort to reduce the strategic small improvements made by producers of
small molecule drugs attempting to extend their market monopoly. Id. § 262(j)(7)(c). The
anti-evergreening provision provides that the following improvements will not receive ex-
clusivity: "a supplement for the biological product that is the reference product," an appli-
cation filed by the sponsor of the original reference product for a change "that results in a
new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system,
delivery device or strength," or "a modification in the structure of the biological product
that does not result in a change in safety, purity, or potency." Id.
332. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gam-
ing, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 711 (2009) ("After Congress corrected that particular [evergreen-
ing] problem, crafty firms took a different tack: rather than stacking patents, they stacked
products-making trivial changes to their product formulation and pulling the old drug
from the market."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) ("In recent years firms have become
quite creative about strategies to secure "evergreening" patents in order to defer the date
their products go off-patent."); Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 30 (2005) (describing a form of evergreening); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1553, 1619 (2006) ("Drug makers have displayed a great deal of ingenuity in preserv-
ing the profits from an innovative drug. The strategies include . . . new patents on the same
drug."); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 30 (2008) ("Patent
owners have strong incentives to extend the life of their patents . . . by "evergreening"-
obtaining multiple patents covering the same product."). For a discussion on the impact of
the doctrine of equivalents on biologics, see Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Con-
text of Follow-on Biologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 9 (2012).
333. See supra text accompanying note 111.
334. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (2009) (The most
fundamental [defense] is that permitting settlement increases the brand-name firm's profits
and hence its expected reward for developing innovating drugs.").
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and how to mix the active ingredient with inactive ingredients to create
an injection, cream, or pill that is safe and effective.335
Scholars suggest that courts are increasingly skeptical of evergreening
strategies,336 but both courts and regulatory agencies struggle to craft le-
gal strategies to separate useful peripheral patents from evergreening.3 37
An examination of the equivalence cases in the context of evergreening
provides two related and important observations. First, it is evident that
courts are in fact becoming increasingly skeptical of evergreening patents.
Second, the cases suggest that courts are using "value" as a shortcut to
determine whether peripheral patents are genuinely useful or are merely
strategic evergreening. Evergreening the patents on the active ingredient
of a drug is essentially never attempted. Patents on other aspects of a
drug-such as formulation, packaging, synthesis, purity, or stability-are
significantly more likely to be targeted in evergreening. As demonstrated
above, plaintiffs holding patents covering the active ingredient of the
drug win seventy-five percent of the time.33 8 This indicates that courts are
willing to give these patents a broad range of equivalents. However,
plaintiffs holding patents that do not cover the active ingredient of the
drug-patents that are more likely to be evergreening patents-win only
twenty-five percent of the time. 339 This suggests that courts give a nar-
rower range of equivalents to patents they suspect are evergreening
patents.
The use of value as the key criteria for determining if the generic drug
infringes on a patent also aids the courts' identification of evergreening
patents. A patent that cannot be worked-around by a generic company is
less likely to be an evergreening patent and more likely to instead pro-
duce genuine value for society in the form of an invention that may not
have been developed otherwise. Similarly, a patent that can be worked-
around by a generic company is more likely to be a weak patent produced
merely as a form of evergreening that adds little value to society.
B. CHEAPER, SAFER MEDICINE
The courts' approach to the equivalence paradox can be explained as a
matter of patent theory and serves a useful role in incentivizing ex post
development and identifying evergreening patents. However, this ap-
335. David Pilling & Richard Wolffe, Drug Abuses: As Pharmaceutical Companies Go
to Extraordinary Lengths to Protect Expiring Patents, Regulators are Starting to Pay Close
Attention, FIN. TIMEs (London), Apr. 20, 2000, at 20 (explaining that scientific experts have
found that new versions of a drug often improve side effects that were problematic in a
prior version of the drug).
336. See Eisenberg, supra note 332, at 356 ("[T]he courts grow more skeptical of ever-
greening strategies . . . .").
337. Glasgow, supra note 320, at 251 (suggesting that the FTC and other agencies hesi-
tate to regulate evergreening because "evergreened" drugs have genuine benefits or be-
cause it is too difficult for courts to sort through "new patents that are actually beneficial
and those that seek to extend a patent monopoly").
338. See supra Part III.
339. See supra Part III.
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proach does not harmonize with the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. A
primary goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to ensure that generic drugs
are available quickly, cheaply, and safely.340 My analysis of the equiva-
lence paradox cases suggests that patent law works against the Hatch-
Waxman Act to delay generic drugs, increase their expense, and some-
times reduce their safety.
The equivalence paradox delays generic entry and increases the ex-
penses of generic drugs. 3 4 1 Generics are permitted to enter the market as
soon as FDA exclusivity expires.342 The exclusivity periods are set by the
Hatch-Waxman Act as a compromise between the generic and brand
name industries.3 4 3 The time frame delineated by the Hatch-Waxman Act
suggests that Congress intended generics to enter the market immediately
after the expiration of the period set by the Hatch-Waxman Act. In prac-
tice, this does not occur if the brand name company retains patent protec-
tion, which is often accomplished through evergreening. 3" Patent law
thus operates to delineate a space where generic companies cannot enter,
despite legislative intent that they do so. 3 45 The doctrine of equivalents
only exacerbates the problem by expanding the fence around the patent.
An argument could be made that courts should never apply the doctrine
of equivalents in these cases because it results in the courts thwarting
clear legislative intent to allow generics into the market. The effect of the
doctrine of equivalents is to delay generic entry by forcing generic manu-
facturers to create broader work-arounds to the patent.
Part of the problem stems from the confused narrative of the proper
role of generic companies. In this narrative, brand name companies are
the innovators, while generic companies are producers of drugs that are
essentially identical to brand name drugs that are created to bring down
the price of medicine. Yet, because generic drugs enter the market before
the brand-name patents have expired, generic companies are also tasked
with innovating. Often, generic companies can create lower cost synthesis
and delivery methods that decrease drug cost and improve drug qual-
ity.3 4 6 Unfortunately, generic drugs encounter a patent system that does
not consistently describe their role, creating problems such as the equiva-
lence paradox. The legal system would do well to recognize generic com-
panies' role in innovation, as well as their role in lowering the cost of
medicine.
The equivalence paradox also has problematic safety implications. 347




344. Gaudry, supra note 111, at 876-78.
345. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
346. See supra Part III.
347. The safety of generic drugs is a particular problem in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (holding that patients injured by
a generic drug product could not sue the generic drug manufacturer under state tort claims
because federal labeling regulations preempted state tort laws).
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Because a generic company must ensure that its product is sufficiently
distant from the brand name product, but still close enough to satisfy the
FDA, the generic product must be similar to but not quite the same as the
brand name product.348 This may incentivize generic companies to work-
around the brand name patent in a way that creates needless safety risks.
For example, generic companies may add impurities to their products to
avoid infringement.349
To understand the possible safety risks, consider the following cases. In
Bio- Technology v. Duramed, the plaintiff produced Mircette, an oral con-
traceptive.350 The contraceptive package was designated such that the
first pill would be taken at the onset of menstruation. 351 The first week of
pills contained estrogen.352 The remaining pills contain a mix of estrogen
and progestin.353 Duramed's generic oral contraceptive reversed this sys-
tem.3 5 4 Menstruation would begin on about day twenty-one of the pack-
age.355 For the first three weeks (before menstruation), the woman would
take a pill containing a mix of estrogen and progestin.356 After the onset
of menstruation, the woman would take the last pills in the package,
which contained only estrogen.357
Imagine a woman whose doctor prescribes her Mircette, explains how
and when to take the pills (beginning within a few days of the start of her
menstrual cycle), and sends her to the pharmacy with a prescription in
hand. The pharmacist, allowed by law to substitute the generic version for
a brand name prescription, gives her Duramed's product. The woman,
having spoken with her doctor about how to take the product, and per-
haps already having years of experience with the brand name product,
scans (or does not read) the instructions, assuming she can take the pills
the way her doctor told her, or the way she had been doing so in the past.
She begins taking the pills the Sunday after her menstrual cycle begins (as
is common for most oral contraceptives). Unbeknownst to her, she is tak-
ing the pills incorrectly because the generic product requires her to start
taking the pills a week later. Her body receives the hormones at the in-
correct time, and the woman unexpectedly gets pregnant. This safety risk
is a very real problem with making small changes to packaging in a ge-
neric product that will be interchangeably supplied by a pharmacy.358
348. See supra Part III.
349. E.g., Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 825 (E.D. Tex. 2011);
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin Ltd., No. 2:05CV421, 2006 WL 1582412, at
*1 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2006).
350. 174 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
351. Id. at 234.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 238.
355. Id. at 240.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Note that Duramed was appealed to the Federal Circuit where it was overturned
on the basis that the district court erred in its claim construction. Bio Tech. Gen. Corp. v.
Duramed Pharm., Inc., 325 F.3d 1356, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit did not
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A second case demonstrating the safety hazard present when a generic
company makes packaging changes is EKR Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries.359 In EKR, the plaintiff produced Cardene, a
drug to treat hypertension. 360 Cardene could not be directly administered
into the body because it was not isotonic (meaning that it had a different
osmotic pressure than cells in the body).3 61 EKR solved this problem by
adding sorbitol to the product, and the patent claimed an "isotonic" com-
position.362 Sun's generic drug was identical to EKR's product except
that it contained about 60% less sorbitol, meaning the solution was no
longer isotonic.363 The directions on Sun's label instructed that the ad-
ministering physician must mix the solution with dextrose to render the
solution isotonic before giving it to a patient.364
Sun's product infringed by equivalents, 365 and thus is not on the mar-
ket; however, it had the potential to cause serious harm. EKR's hyperten-
sion drug does not need to be diluted. 366 Sun's hypertension drug did. 36 7
A physician accustomed to using EKR's product might not realize that
the product was a generic product, and he might administer the generic
without dilution. Alternatively, he might know the generic required dilu-
tion, but might dilute it incorrectly because he was tired or made some
other human error. EKR, the pre-diluted product, removes this dilution
requirement and thus removes an opportunity for unintentional mistakes
in dosage.
The types of small changes generic companies make to stay bioe-
quivalent while avoiding infringement may result in products with these
sorts of safety risks. Fortunately, neither product is on the market. Al-
though courts do not explicitly consider patient safety when ruling on
doctrine of equivalents questions, in these cases it seems as if the doctrine
of equivalents provides a patient safety benefit. Nevertheless, judges368-
or worse, jurieS369-are poorly positioned to rule on safety issues, and
reach the question of infringement by equivalents, but remanded for further consideration.
Id. at 1364.
359. See 633 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.N.J. 2009).
360. Id. at 189.
361. Id. at 195.
362. Id. at 193.
363. Id. at 194.
364. Id. at 196.
365. Id. at 207.
366. Id. at 193.
367. Id. at 196.
368. There is ample evidence that judges and juries are ill-equipped to make scientific
decisions. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 244, at 1196 ("Judges are at a rather serious
disadvantage in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist.");
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J. L. TECH. 1, 38 (2002) (concluding that "judges are not, at present, capable of
resolving these [scientific patent] issues with sufficient accuracy"); Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) ("Generalist trial judges, and juries empaneled by trial judges, may
be overwhelmed by the technology involved in patent cases.").
369. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998) (arguing that judges and juries do not understand the
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safety issues have no relation to the patent law on which courts base their
decision. It would be better to craft laws that avoid giving generic compa-
nies perverse incentives to make products less safe.
VII. CONCLUSION
The findings of this article are important to patent theorists and policy
makers. Although this paradox does not exist in industries that are less
regulated, the commercial value calculus courts use when analyzing in-
fringement questions may translate to other industries. Moreover, my
finding that courts adjust the scope of equivalents to improve the corre-
spondence between patent scope and desired patent incentives is applica-
ble across patent law. Because pharmaceuticals operate on a portfolio
model, courts in equivalence paradox cases have been unable to tailor
patents to fit ex ante incentives, but industries where portfolios are less
prevalent should not encounter this problem. With respect to the pharma-
ceutical industry, this Article provides an important data point about pat-
entees' and courts' approaches to evergreening and highlights the conflict
created by the multiple legal frameworks that affect the industry.
technology in scientific cases and thus make arbitrary decisions based upon experts' cre-
dentials, reputation, and demeanor); Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious
Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 CARDOzo L. REV. 1361, 1389-96 (2003);
Robert D. Myers et al., Complex Scientific Evidence and the Jury, 83 JUDICATURE 150, 152
(1991) (suggesting that a jury comprised of lay people will have difficulty being "a compe-
tent fact finder and decision-maker in lengthy trials that require comprehension of substan-
tial quantities of complex scientific, technical, or statistical evidence and resolving the
testimony of expert witnesses whose opinions conflict"); Joseph Saunders, Scientifically
Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 355, 356 (1998); Barry S. Wilson, Patent Invalidity and the Seventh Amendment: Is the
Jury Out?, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1787, 1787 (1997) (arguing that juries favor inventors
and are biased against large corporations or foreign defendants). But see Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, C.J., concurring)
("There is simply no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to
resolve the complex technological issues often present in patent cases."); Howard T. Mar-
key, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 372 (1987) (noting that there is no em-
pirical evidence supporting the contention that judges are more likely to correctly decide
patent cases than juries.); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Em-
pirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MIcH. L. REV. 365, 370-74 (2000) (conducting an
empirical study of the way that judges and juries decide patent cases and determining that
while it is unclear whether judges or juries decide the cases better, they do decide them
differently).
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